CF WW2 maps

To download from this site, Right Click the link and choose 'Save Link As'

The Maps

All my Maps below use 'custom' .units and .tiles definition files (which replace the 'default.units' and 'default.tiles' used in the standard maps). The required units and tiles files are included in the (map).zip download in each section. Using these files, you can use the standard CoMET tool to modify my compiled (.lev) maps if you wish (I retain Copyright to the .units and .tiles files)

To create or modify the maps 'by hand', you can create or modify the ascii .src versions. To play the .src, it must be 'compiled' together with the relevant .units and .tiles files (see individual battles, below), using the cfed.exe the map .src to .lev build utility.
 
To make your own .units from your own .bmp images and .usrc unit definitions, your need the mkunitset.exe tool (from a Command Prompt, "mkunitset myunits.bmp myudefs.usrc mynew.units")
 
To make your own .tiles from your own .bmp tile images and .tsrc tile definitions, your need the mktileset.exe tool (from a Command Prompt, "mktileset myTiles.bmp myTdefs.usrc mynew.tiles")
 
All 3 .exe tools mentioned above are part of Crimson Fields

I retain Copyright to my own Maps, Units and Terrain (artwork and definitions) files, however I grant you the standard open Source Licence for personal use

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Alternate history "scenarios"

My historical Maps have 'historically accurate' forces pre-deployed for both sides (as far as possible = toward the end of the war, confusion and limited records mean the Axis forces are sometimes 'best guess'). However, in many cases, this means the players are almost forced into 'historical outcomes', especially when constrained by the (historically accurate) timing (and types) of re-enforcements.

To allow some flexibility, in cases where it would have been possible or reasonable to swap or assign other available units, I've given the human player(s) 'resources' (so they can 'build' their own units from a list of those that were historically available)
 
However, all too often, these historically accurate forces (and the pre-deployments) limit the outcome 'no matter what'. The problem is that the available weapons and forces are always limited by each sides past decisions on weapon developments (and troop training).
 
Further, any student of military history will 'know what to expect' from their opponent - both in terms of weapons and deployment - which really limits the possibility of any surprises :-)
 
Another issue is that the Allies (and British in particular) never seem to make plans for any 'follow-up' (or 'fall-back') in the event that things go better (or worse) than expected (so when they succeed - as at 2nd Alamein - the Axis manage to escape, whilst when they (start to) fail - as at Dieppe - they just feed the rest of their forces into the killing zones).
 
Whilst the players can make their own decisions during actual battle, if no troops were held in reserve historically (to 'follow up' a breakthrough or 'counter attack' to prevent such a breakthrough) then the players just don't have that option
 
In order to provide players with more options, I have to generate my own 'alternative history' ...

First I consider why things 'played out' as they did - for more see "The Constraints of History" below :-

(+) The Constraints of History

To overcome the Constraints of History takes a combination of individual action and luck. The UK has it's fair share of both prior to, and during, WW2, however it was without doubt 'a near run thing'.

With a bit of luck, two individuals could have changed the course of the war - the first is Churchill (who was only made First Lord of the Admiralty on 3 September 1939 and only became Prime Minister on 10 May 1941) his earlier appointment would have made significant differences in British war preparations. The other was Frank Whittle = he was (essentially) ignored for 10 years. With proper backing, Britain could have entered the jet age before 1939 ...

There is a 3rd individual whose malign influence diverted huge numbers of trained men and squandered massive amounts of vital resources. His actions essentially handed Europe to the Americas and Russians - without him, thousands of both German and British lives would have been spared. For more, see how it could have been "Less of a near run thing" below :-

(-) Less of a near run thing - (How UK wins the war and saves lives)

British "alternative history" of WW2

This note still under construction

WW2 started before anyone was really prepared - despite all the warning signs, the 'brinkmanship' politics of Hitler and the vocal warnings of individuals like Churchill. German invades Poland on 1st Sept 1039 and the British and French decalre war on the 3rd. When the Soviets invaded Poland from the East on the 17th Spet. the British and French were too shocked to respond.

Indeed, so shocked are the British and French to find themselves at war with Germany that they simply sat on their hands and did virtually nothing for the next 8 months, except watch Poland be destroyed and partitioned (on 6th Oct 1939) and then wait to see who the Nazi's attacked next.

It seems that both the British and French were rather hoping the peace would break out - so neither did anything to 'antagonise' the Germans - the British immediately dropped leaflets appealing for peace, and the French forces walked almost 5 miles into Germany - against no resistance - and then withdrew before the German forces turned up to fight. As the French withdrew, they told the Poles that 'help is on the way'.

In mid 1940 the Germans invade Denmark (9th April) and then Belgium (10th May) and the real fighting starts.

Despite extensive reports of the German forces performance in Poland, neither the British nor the French have managed to learn a thing. Respecting the Danish border, the BEF and French troops wait on French soil for the command to 'advance and dig in'. For the French, who saw half of norther France devastated by trench warfare in WW1, it is vital that the next war be fought on Belgium soil.

Having done nothing more to prepare, the tactics and equipment of the French and British forces will prove useless against the fast moving mass tank (and Stuka supported) 'spearhead' of the German 'Blitzkrieg'.

As the first german mobile forces 'punch through' the troops 'digging in' in Belgium, the aged and outdated French and British 'central command' is unable respond in any meaningful way. Even the commanders in the field were unable to discover what was happening fast enough to issue meaningful orders. When orders were issued the infexible communications system - which was based on field telephones to the 'forward trenchs' - was largly incapable of delivering them. Of course couriers where used, but the despatch riders generally had even less idea of where to find the recipients than the Generals did.

The Germans punch straight through the front line - and then keep pressing onward, never giving the allies a chance to 'fall back' to 'take up prepared positions'. Soon everyone in the North is retreating west in an effort to 'get in front of' the fast moving German forces.

Just when things couldn't get any worse for the allied forces in the north, the real German attack comes through the Ardennes. The BEF and the cream of the French Army see the danger and try to retreat towards the south, however the BEF and the bulk of the French troops are cut off to the North.

Some British and French tanks did attempt counter attacks, however neither were able to co-ordinate their tanks with their infantry and artillery, let alone provide air cover. Some 8 months after Poland, neither the British nor the French had grasped how the Germans used their air-force as an 'artillery substitute' - nor had they grasped how German tanks 'decoy' enemy tanks onto the German anti-tank guns.

The British, whose forces were more mobile and whose tanks were more concentrated to start with, were shot to pieces as they employed 'cavalry' tactics. Those tanks crews that did "get to grips with the enemy" watched in despair as their puny 2pdr solid shot ammunition bounced off or shattered against the face hardened German armour.

The Germans had outrun their own air-support. The German 37L45 PAK36 standard anti-tank gun was no more effective against British armour than the British 40L50 2pdr anti-tank gun was against the German armour. However the German 88mm AntiAircraft Gun had been supplied with AT ammunition (it had first been used as an anti-tank gun 5 years ago, in the Spanish civil war) and engaged the British tanks at their leisure. Although the 88mm gun has a high profile and makes a large target, and the crew had no protection, they were virtually immune to British counter-fire. Firing on the British tanks at ranges of up to 2km, this was well outside machine gun range and the puny British tank 2pdr gun had no HE capability.

The French tanks had better guns (incliding one with a 75mm gun and HE ammunition) but moved at infantry speed and had very limited range, designed as they were to support the infantry and be refueled every night. The French issued a blizard of orders, attempting to concentrrate their forces against the German advance, however their command structure was much too slow.

Their tanks - which had been spread out over the entire front as per best French tactics - were being destroyed one at a time.

Almost before orders were delivered, destination positions were being over-run and the French directed their tanks to concentrate at one location after another. Tanks were arriving at refueling depots only to discover them abandoned, with the fuel sent elsewhere, or never having arrived in the first place.

The Germans also had fuel problems - the advance of their tanks had outrun their refueling trucks. However since their tanks used petrol engines they were able to refuel at civilian petrol stations 'en route'. No-one on the Allied side had even considered this possibility, so no plans had been made to deny them this resource. Since the 'front line' was supposed to have been in Belgium, no French roads were mined and no bridges blown up. In short, the Germans could go anywhere they liked with virtual impunity.

Eventally one French Tank brigade did manage to concentrate almost be accident, having arrived at the 'front' by rail. Their commander hijacked a fuel convoy by force to refuel his tanks, only to have the attack orders cancelled after 24 hrs. when it became obvious that the supporting infantry and artillery would never arrive.

On the allied side, all was confusion and disorder, whilst the Germans just blitzed on past them.

As the leading German tanks came to a halt before Dunkirk (and radioed for more supplies), the French high command in Paris was still sending written orders by messenger twice a day from one office to another demanding that units already over-run by the German advance be instructed to take up positions in towns already lost.

Meanwhile, as their forces on the ground were forced to retreat or be encircled, the British High Command recognised the need to save their men. In fact, contingency plans had been put into place well in advance and soon an evacuation was ordered.

The French, who had no real plans of any sort, were later to criticise the British approach. Plainly they had never heard of the British saying 'he who fights and runs away, lives to fight another day'. Instead, the French CinC Gamelin sacked 20 of his front line commanders after which the 68-year-old Gamelin was himself sacked and replaced by the 73-year-old Maxime Weygand. Waygand proved even less effective than Gamelin and further delayed the already inadequately planned and now much too late counter-attacks.

French morale collapsed and, despite British appeals to fight on, they were soon looking for ways to surrender. By declaring Paris 'an open city' - rather than a Stalingrad - they saved their architecture but cost the rest of the world millions of non-French human lives. Hitler rewarded them by 'only' occupying half their country = he plainly realised that he had nothing to fear from the other half. In later years the myth of the thousands of French who resisted as part of the Maquis replaced the fact of the millions who surrendered and willingly collaborated (although, to be fair, the French 'only' sent some 25% of the Jews in France to their deaths).

When the French fleet was given an ultimatum - join the British (and fight on), scuttle their ships or be fired upon, they chose the only option that misguided 'French pride' allowed. In short, they did exactly what they had done since the start of the war in Sept. 1939 - nothing. Once again, lives were lost through the utter incompetence of their commanders when the British opened fire - they hadn't even evacuated the crews. The real British mistake was a failure to offer them an acceptable alternative - the immediate surrender of their ships to the Britsh ...

With twisted logic, the French came to 'blame the British for betraying them', ignoring the utter incompetence and outright cowardice of their leaders. If the French command had fought with half the determination of the British or the Russians, they would have stopped the Germans in 1940 in Paris. The French ships could have saved thousands of British - and later American - merchantmen from the U-boats and might even have allowed the US forces to build up early enough for D-Day to be launched a year earlier.

In short, it's hard to see how the French could have done any worse. It's also hard to see how they could have done any better, condemmed as they were by their chaotic "socialist" Government and outmoded 'head in the (Maginot line) ground' military thinking.

In any half-decent 'alternative history' the French would have invested the resources wasted on the Maginot Line in a mobile 'counter strike' tank force which could have been in Berlin whilst the German Army was still fighting in Poland. Even with the waste of the Maginot Line they had more than sufficient forces to have stopped the Germans in a Paris 'Stalingrad' in 1940. So no Dunkirk and no Battle of Britain.

Instead I focus on the British.

Historically :-
Germany invades Poland on 1 Sept. 1939, Britain (Neville Chamberlain) declares War on Germany on 3rd Sept. 1939.
 - a full 7 months pass during which Germany (and Soviet Russia) dismember Poland whilst Britain and France 'prepare their defences'
Germany invades Denmark / Norway on 9 April 1940
Germany invades Belgium on 10th May 1940 = and Churchill becomes Prime Minister on the same day (Friday 10 May 1940)
The BEF is rescued from Dunkirk between 26 May and 4 June 1940
German forces occupied Paris (unopposed) on 14 June 1940, leading to the collapse of the French Government
Germany meets with the new French Government on 18 June and the "armistice" (surrender) is signed on 22 June 1940.
3 July 1940, the British Navy attacks the French Fleet at Mers El Kébir (on the coast of French Algeria)
(later, on 27 November 1942, the French scuttled the rest of their fleet in Toulon to prevent the Germans siezing them)

The case for an alternative history.

Churchill was Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1924 to 1929 but during the 1930's he was 'only' a simple MP. However, at every opportunity he spoke out against German rearmament, Britain's lack of military strength, and the likely intentions of Adolf Hitler.

He was so outspoken that, in July 1939, British newspapers could overwhelmingly demand that Churchill be made a member of the Cabinet (the first such article was on July 2). He is appointed First Lord of the Admiralty on 3 September 1939 = the same day Britain declared war on Germany (and way way too late to make much difference to British preparations). It is not until Germany invades Belgium on 10 May 1940 that he becomes Prime Minister, and then only just in time to rescue the BEF 16 days later !

If the British are to be better prepared, Churchill must have the authority to direct those preparations MUCH earlier than 1939 !!

However, whilst there are earlier dates on which he could have been made Prime Minister, he would than have 'stood up to Hitler' at an earlier date and WW2 might have started much earlier - or not at all.

So the earliest 'realistic' date for Churchill to become Prime Minister (without effecting the start of the war) would be 1st Sept 1939.

Thus, on the same day Germany invades Poland, a 'no confidence' vote is moved in the British Parliament. The Government looses and Chamberlain is forced to resign. With no-one else willing to serve, Churchill is appointed PM. On the 2nd Sept. he appoints his war cabinet and gets their agreement to the 'Ultimatum' - and to issue the pre-prepared war plans to all British forces, especially the Navy.

As happended historically, the British ambassador to Berlin hands a final 'note' to the German Government on the morning of the 3rd saying unless it announced plans to withdraw from Poland by 11:00 (BST), a state of war would exist between the two countries.

At 11:15 BST the new Prime Minister, Winston Churchill announced that the British deadline for the withdrawal of German troops from Poland had expired, saying "With a heavy heart I have to tell you that despite our every wish, Hitlers forces continue with their invasion of innocent Poland and consequently this country is at war with Germany."

Historically, just over an hour later, at 12:30, the French also issue an ultimatum, saying France would be at war unless a 17:00 deadline for the troops' withdrawal was adhered to.

However the British forces are already in action. Before the 1st of Sept., the much of the British fleet - and all the Aircraft cariers - was already at sea 'conducting exercises' - indeed, half the british submarine force, ammounting to some 250 boats, have been 'conducting exercises' since mid August. Two Carrier groups are stalking German Navy ships in the North Sea, with four others in the Baltic. Each carrier group is supported by a dozen submarines. Over 100 British submarines are operating independently or in pairs elsewhere areound the world.

For the last year, the position of every German U-boat putting to sea has been 'tracked' by the code-breakers at Bletchley Park. Each has been followed by an Anti-Submarine force consisting of at least one Destroyer and 4 ASW frigates.

On 2nd Sept. the preplanned 'hour 0 strike' orders are opened by both the Navy and RAF. World-wide British Navy ships and submarines move toward their targets. The BBC broadcasts a 'live report' from Scapa Flow where the 'British Home Fleet is being prepared'. They report that 'all eight of our front-line Battleships are being made ready' and that 'sailors on leave have been ordered to report to their ships within 48 hours'. The message being sent to the Germans - and the British public - is that Britain is getting ready for war - not that it is preparing to attack. In particular, the message is that the 'Home Fleet' is in port .. and not at sea.

By the morning of the 3rd, the Navy and RAF have had 24 hrs to make their final preparations. At 11:00, as the deadline expires, the Navy Fleet Carriers started to launch their strike aircraft and RAF bombers start to take off from airfields in Essex. The Bombers targets are some 300-400 miles away on the German coast. Take off are staggared to ensure the aircraft reach their targets simulatneousley. The pilots tune to the BBC - there is still time for them to be recalled. 15 mins later they relaise that no recall will be issued.

At 11:15 am, as the German and British alike listen to Churchill on the BBC, German Navy ships around the world come under attack from British submarines and Carrier launched Baufighter precision bombers. More submarines and Carrier torpedo planes attack the German fleet support vessels, especially the oilers. A few miniutes later, after flying in at low level and then gaining height, the first Navy dive bombers are attacking the German coastal radar stations.

At 11:30, having flown past the radar stations, low flying Carrier launched Navy dive bombers and Baufighter ground attack aircraft protected by Seafires are attacking the German air 'command and control' centers along with the airfields and Luffwaffe facilities near the coast.

During the next 30 mins, every German coastal radar station and airfield is put out of action. At the airfields fuel and ammunition storage is targetted by dive bombers whilst the Baufighters shoot up aircraft on the ground along with the hangers and other 'soft' targets. The Baufighters also scatter thousands of small mines over the runways. Those few German aircraft that do manage to take off are dealt with by the Seafires wh then join the Baufighters shooting up anything left standing.

At 13:00 the first RAF Heavy Bombers start to drop precision guided bombs onto German Navy ships moored in port. They also attack the shipyards, drydocks, oil storage depots and other Naval facilites.

By 13:30 a second wave of Carrier aircraft are pounding the German airfields again as the last of the first wave of RAF Bombers attack targets - oil storage and rail heads - further inland.

There then follows a lull whilst the Navy reconnaissance aircraft asses the initial damage and re-targets the second wave of RAF bombers who are now en-route. This also gives the Carrier aircraft time to refuel and rearm.

By mid afternoon every U-boat at sea has been sunk or has surrendered. Co-ordinated by the controllers in the 'plotting room' of the destroyer, during the morning the ASW frigates moved to surround the estimated position of each U-boat. At ll:15am the ships turned on their ASDIC (Sonar) equipment and then, just as they had practiced in dozens of training exercises, moved to 'box in' the U-boat. The destroyer co-ordinates the movement of the frigates and their ASDIC equipment. Both the timing and audio burst tone frequency were continually adjusted to avoid mutual interference. Any 'returns' are transmitted automatically to the plotting room where the U-boat's position and course is calculated. Soon one frigate is positioned in front of the U-boats predicted position, one behind and one (or two, if 6 frigates were available) on each side and the U-boat is surrounded.

Once caught in this way, no matter how it tries to twist and turn, the plotting room follows it's every change of course. Then, unlike the practice, the analogue 'prediction' computers on the ASW frigate behind the U-boat is activated. The Captain speeds up and aligns himself with the U-boats path as the other frigates 'rotate' their positions clockwise, with the right most dropping to the vacated rear position, the front to the right and the left to the front. After the 'computer' automatically fires the hollow charge 'hedgehog' mortars to rain down a hail of missiles into the U-boat's predicted path, the Captain steers his frigate off to the left to take up that now vacated position.

After a quick check on the ASDIC to make sure the U-boat is still boxed, the new rearmost frigate moves up to attack. This sequence is then repeated as each of the other frigates makes its own attack in turn. It takes about 30 miniutes for the first frigate to 'rotate' back to it's original position behind the U-boat. Bu then, the crew has finished reloading the hedgehog. The frigate then speeds up again an2wd makes another attack. This process is continued until the U-boat is sunk or surfaces and surrenders. Each frigate has a dozen reloads which allows the attack to be sustained for up to 6 hours, during which time the U-boat will have been 'targetted' by a total of 1152 shells.

The hollow-charge shell is relativly small but only detonates on contact punching a fist sized hole through the pressure hull. If the U-boat is anywhere near it's maximium depth, this is often enough to 'prick the balloon' causing the hull to collapes. At more shallow depths, sometimes they do enough damage to sink the U-boat, but more often the result is limited internal damage and the flooding of a single compartment. However with each frigate firing two dozen shells in a patturn that, at shallow depth targets, typically results in two or more hits, it doesn't take long to flood the entire submarine.

At 17:00, as the French declare war, the second wave of RAF bombers arrive to pound German coastal targets, along with the 3rd wave of Carrier aircraft. This time the focuss is on the smaller ships - especially the mine-sweepers - and the docks and support facilities.

As the light fades on the first day, the British Carrier force withdraws whilst the last few mines are being laid to 'close off' the German ports.

For such a strike to take place, Churchill has to be in a position to ensure the necessary plans and preparations are made. In WW1 he held the position of War Minister, however after WW1 that post was abolished. So it has to be First Lord of the Admiralty. As commander of the Navy Air-force, he will have the necessary influence over aircraft requirements and Aircraft Carrier design and build.

However, it takes time to design and build aircraft carriers, so we have to go back 4 or 5 years. The same applies to aircraft - however, even more critical is the direction taken by the RAF on bombing policy. In 1936 the 'received wisdom' was that "The bomber will always get through" and it is in 1936 that 'high priority' was placed on the creation of a large bomber force to 'spearhead' British 'offensive power' and Bomber Command is created.

Churchill has to be in a position before 1936 to prevent the formation of Bomber Command and direct British air offensive policy toward 'precision strikes'. Inevitably, once Bomber Command has been created it will go off and insist it can win the war on it's own. This patent nonsense will be believed by the "Bomber will always get through" idiots. Once the concept of 'area bombing' takes hold it inevitably leads to the appointment (in Feb. 1942) of Air Marshal Arthur 'Bomber' Harris and the '1,000 bomber raids' on cities at the limits of their range like Berlin with consequent massive losses of British aircrew and pointless mass murder of German civilians.

By 1939 it's way too late to change direction and, despite the fact that by 1942 the Battle of Britain had conclusively proved that the bomber WON'T "always get through", Bomber Command really had no other option if they were to 'justify their existance'. Even so - against the wishes of Harris - they did manage some precision strikes. The example set by the 'Dam Busters' raid shows what can be achieved. All we need is for sufficient scientific effort to be put into precision bombing before the war starts.

If Churchill takes over the Navy in 1935, he will have at least 4 years to ensure 'precision bombing' becomes a reality - after all, Churchill knows you can't use 'area bombing' to sink enemy ships (or U-boats) :-)

With his influence, the 'official' RAF bomber policy will become 'one bomber, one target, one bomb'. Heavy bombers will not be developed to drop hundrends of dumb bombs on cities but to drop single massive 'smart' bombs on German Battleships, ship-yards and docks, command and control centers and HQ's, ammunition and oil storage, munition factories and oil refineries, rail-heads, canal locks and all other such military and infrastructure targets.

Hundreds, rather than thousands, of heavy bombers will be built, with the resources - and aircrew - thus not squandered on pointless 'city busting' being used to expand the twin engined Baufiughter - and later Mosquito - ground attack aircraft. The British bomber force will remain part of the RAF - there will ne no seperate fighter command - and be dedicated to helping the Navy defend Britain and helping the Army win the War.

NB. To ensure the RAF wins the Battle of Britain 'hands down', all we need is for some-one with influence to send Frank Whittle to the Rolls Royce engineering department in the 1930's (instead of ignoring him for 10 years).

The run up to an 'alternative' history

Historically :-
In 1931, Britain has a coalition government led by the former Labour Prime Minister, James Ramsay MacDonald. In September 1931, during the Great Depression, the National Government launched 10% cuts across the board for public sector workers. In the Navy this was 10% for new entrants in 1925 but those ratings below petty officer who had joined before 1925 would have their pay reduced to the same level, amounting to a 25% cut. This led more or less directly to the Invergordon Mutiny, perhaps the closest UK has ever come to a communist revolution (it should be remembered that the Russian revolution started with a Naval mutiny).

(Naval reductions)

In 1935, early March, a British government White Paper justifies higher defence budget (on the grounds that Germany was violating the Versailles Treaty) - Hitler takesa offence and Navy Treaty talks are postponed.

On 21 May 1935, Hitler formally offered to discuss a Treaty on the basis of the German Navy limited forever to a 35:100 ratio with the British. Admiral Sir Ernle Chatfield (who was promoted to Admiral of the Fleet on 3 May 1935) has been fighting hard for British re-armament but now argues strongly in favour of a treaty (hoping this will limit Hitlers forces). On 22 May, the British Cabinet agrees.

On 5 June, Ribbentrop is in London to completes the 35/100 wording and the British Cabinet votes to accept.

On 7 June, Ramsay MacDonald (Labour), who's mental and physical health has been declining since 1931 (and who's own party was always opposed to the coalition anyway) resigns in favour of Stanley Baldwin (Conservative), who thus becomes the coalition Prime Minister (he holds a general election in the autumn and the Conservatives win).

The Anglo-German Naval Pact was signed in London on 18 June 1935.

The 'alternative' history

In 1931, Churchill stands up for the Navy, demanding that the 10% cut be implemented 'fairly and equally across all ranks'. The Government releases a statement that 'no Naval personal will suffer more than a 10% cut in their wages'. The communists still attempt to spark a Naval mutiny with miss-information and lies of '25% cuts', however Churchill's intervention has ensured no mutiny will take place. Whilst this has minimal effect on the historical sequence, it gains him considerable support among the 'rank and file' of the Navy.

Since 23 May 1935 the British press has been full of rumours (fed by Churchill and his supporters) of an impending 'betrayal of Versailles' and 'stab in the back of the British Navy'. Crowds have been gathering outside Downing Street all week. So when on 5 June, the Cabinet meets to sign the Treaty they have to walk past the chants of 'cowards', 'sell outs' and 'traitors'. When Admiral Sir Ernle Chatfield arrives to deliver his recomendations, he comes under 'attack' from a shower of eggs. He is shaken but still advises that a Treaty is better than nothing.

On 6 June, after the Treaty has been signed and announced to the House of Commons, Churchill gets up to deliver a rousing speech complaining of 'appeasement' to 'the Dictator of the Bosch' ending by waving a copy of the 'Naval Agreement' and shouting 'The German Navy has no overseas terratory to protect. Why then is Hitler building Battelships ? His only intention must be to attack by sea ! Who will be the first to suffer from new German Navy - us or the French ? This will mean War In Our Time !!'. When Ramsay MacDonald gets up to reply, a shower of white feathers floats down from the public gallery (Churchill's supporters have come well prepared).

For Ramsay MacDonald, who's' idealistic pacifist views of the past are well known, it's the final straw. He was planning to resign anyway, but remain within the Cabinet. He decides to retire from politics and resigns his seat. As he hands over to Stanley Baldwin (the new PM) his last piece of advise is that 'the only way to shut up Churchill is to make him part of the Cabinet'.

The following day (Friday, 7 June 1935), Baldwin appoints Churchill to a Cabinet post as "First Minister of the Navy" with a brief to ensure the Germans stick to the "35% Agreement". The First Sea Lord is told that Churchill will have no responsibility for the day-to-day running of the Navy.

However Churchill knows that holding meetings with Nazi shipbuilders and accompanying teams of 'Inspectors' into Nazi Germany will just be a total and utter waste of precious time. Believing war is inevitable, he throws himself into the task of preparing the Navy for war - and is in a position to influence the other armed services as well - a full 4 years before war is declared.

Working closely with Admiral Sir Ernle Chatfield he immediately starts putting into effect his own 'preparation for war' plans. By the time Baldwins resigns (28 May 1937), advising the new King to send for Chamberlain, Churchill has won the respect of the rest of the Cabinet and is no longer seen as a 'thorn in the side of Government'. Whilst he continues to speak out against appeasement in Cabinet, his public speeches are more restrained.

Churchill soon manages to abolish many of the 'Armed Forces Requirements Committees' replace them with 'Action Teams' (comprised of serving military, scientists and industrialists (i.e. those who know what they need to fight, those who know what's possible and can design it, and those who know how to build it). A civil servant is present only to take notes and report direct to Churchill (one thing his 'reporter' is sure to note is the attitude and effectiveness of each member of the Team).

Unlike Hitler - who is busy exaggerating German capabilities - Churchill is convinced that no amount of 'demonstrating our capabilities' will now act as a 'deterrent'. So, as far as possible, Churchill's preparations are conducted in secret - the last thing he wants is Hitler using British 're-armament' as an excuse for further German re-armament. He is also well aware that many in the Cabinet (and Government) will see preparations of any sort as a 'provocation' that will allow Hitler to justify the (already well advanced) re-armament of Germany, and thus try to put a stop to him.

Churchill's Navy preparations will have a positive influence on the RAF. Fighters are required for the Navy's Aircraft Carriers (armed with cannon, to take on surfaced U-boats, rather than the useless .303 machine guns preferred by the RAF). His demands for a precision strike capability will have a positive effect on the RAF bomber requirements - the Navy requires a bomber force that can take out German Battleships and shipyards, not one that can only get 10% of it's bombs within 5 miles of the target. Precision targeting becomes a 'priority goal'. There is no separate Bomber Command - the RAF will build hundreds of precision bombers with highly trained crews capable of finding and hitting their targets, not thousands of bombers withe crews who couldn't even find the right city.

In mid 1935, the Whittle Jet proposals (see below) will reach Churchill's ear, and Churchill will convince the RAF to send Whittle to Rolls Royce (instead of them ignoring him for another 6 years). This will be 'just in time' to get the first jet powered fighter into the air for the Battle of Britain.

The RAF will also gain from Navy aircraft requirements = the Navy 'anti U-boat' attack aircrfat will become the RAF 'anti-tank' ground attack aircraft (armed with cannon and not the impressive but almost useless unguided rockets).

The Army will gain from the Navy Radar requirements, Navy gun targeting systems and Navy Anti-Aircraft needs = the 6pdr anti-tank gun is the Navy 6pdr anti-aircraft gun on a gun carriage.

However, in one area the Army will be largely unaffected = the Government's plans for the BEF and it's outmoded thinking and utterly out-dated tanks.

How lessons from the past guide Churchill's war preparations

Churchill is well aware of the many mistakes leading to avoidable losses (and missed opportunities) of the British Navy during WW1. Indeed, he was (at least partially) responsible for many of these himself !

In the 'alternative history', Churchill will be determined to 'fix' the issues and avoid errors.

Typically, to fix issues he will set up "Action Teams", consisting of Scientists, weapons factory Engineers and Naval officers serving at sea. Each Action Team is expected to come up with the ideas, prove they work and implement them, often by having 'conversion kits' built. In many cases (such as new AA guns) 'kits' will be installed on existing Navy Ships 'in secret' at ports around the world i.e. out of sight of the British Press and German observers.

The 'on-shore' Naval High Command are specifically excluded from 'wasting their time running around the world and playing with nuts and bolts' = instead they are allowed to sit on the few remaining 'requirements committees' = however Churchill will 'vet' each 'requirement' before he allows it to go forward to the ship builders.

To avoid errors, the Navy commanders will require extensive training in modern equipment and tactics. Officers will have to be re-evaluated and those incapable of adopting a 'flexible' approach removed from the 'chain of command'. This means many of the 'older generation' will have to go - and one way to achieve this is to implement annual medical check-ups for all ships Captains and above. It is not long before there is a massive increase in the number of senior Naval Officers retiring (on a full Pension) due to 'ill health'.

Lessons from the past - Dardanelles, 18 March 1915.

During his previous term as First Sea Lord, Churchill was responsible for Naval operations in the Dardanelles Campaign (17 February 1915 to 9 January 1916). When the Campaign failed he was blamed for the ships lost, however Churchill reads the 'action reports' from cover to cover. He especially notes that :-

1) Long-range naval gunfire is extremely inaccurate.
The Ottoman defences consisted of minefields protected by coastal defense guns. In order to clear the mines, first the coastal guns would have to be knocked out. In general, the British and French battleship guns out-ranged those of the coastal defences, so it should have been an 'open and shut case'.

However it was not to be. Between 19 February and 18th of March 1915 a combined force of 12 British and French Battleships fired thousands of shells at the big stationary coastal defense forts to minimal effect. The only 'hits' obtained were by sheer by luck ! In short, whist the Navy gunfire was 'fast and furious' it was totally inaccurate !

[Spotter seaplanes from HMS Ark Royal (Britain's first real Aircraft carrier, launched 5 Sept 1914) could have made a difference to the accuracy of the Naval gun-fire. However when this was first tried only one managed to take off due to bad weather (at that time seaplanes did not take off from the deck, rather they were 'launched' by crane into the sea ..) and whilst Ark Royal's planes WERE used to 'spot' minefields, there seems to have been no further attempt to use them to direct gunfire - not that this is likely to have been successful anyway (see later re: communications)]

The only way to achieve hits was to get in close - and then it turns out that it's much easier to hit a moving target (battleship) using a stationary gun (coastal defence battery) than it is for a moving gun (on a battleship) to hit a non-moving target (coastal defence gun) - a fact that's been known since the time of Nelson (but seems to be forgotten by each new generation of Naval commanders).

In an alternative time-line, Churchill sets up an "Action Team" to discover/invent, test and implement ways and means of improving the accuracy of long-range gun-fire by British Battleships

Initially this focuses on optical means (and over the next 3 years new range finder kits are retro-fitted to all capital ships), however soon they focus on use of spotter planes (which are fitted with 'real time' radio communications links direct to the Gunnery Control centers). This requires Aircraft Carriers be built (see later)

Then the focus shifts to the new advancements in Radar ..

2) Predictable actions lead to predictable defeat.
Admiral of the Fleet Sir John Michael de Robeck, was only 53 but was still living in the age of Nelson. Apparently incapable of comprehending the danger of maneuvering his ships in a repeatable and predictable way, he spent weeks bombarding the Coastal defences each morning and retiring each afternoon by the same route. He also seems to have regarded the mines and coastal batteries together as 'fixed defense' that, once 'dealt with', would then allow the campaign to proceed. The possibility that the enemy would be clever enough to replace 'swept' mines (or even add new mines) seems to have been largely ignored.

When the Ottoman commander notes the predictable movement of de Robeck's ships, during the night of 8 March a single Ottoman mine-layer laid a single string of 20 mines in a line parallel to the shore and across the predictable path of the attacking ships.

In an alternative time-line, Churchill sets up mandatory war-game "training and evaluation" courses for all Naval commanders.

During the 'training' phase, commanders play against the 'umpire' who is first constrained to the tactics employed by a WW1 'enemy' fleet and then the more modern known tactics and capabilities of the current Nazi ships.

Once they have mastered the basics, Commanders then play against each other using the current and 'soon to be fitted' Naval capabilities. The umpire determines battle outcomes (with chance determining things like weather).

Individual performance is noted and an over-all rating assigned ("unacceptable (retire)", "acceptable" or "outstanding (promote)"). It soon becomes apparent that few Naval 'Senior ranks' have the necessary ability to grasp the capabilities of modern technical equipment (especially radio, radar, RDF etc) or to make even simulated use of this during combat, with the result that almost all those above the rank of Ships Captain are rated 'unacceptable'.

However it will be difficult to make immediate changes as it soon become apparent that some of the very worst performers are some of the most senior commanders !!!

Churchill manages to maneuver many into retirement 'due to ill-health' - and then the worst of the rest are 'promoted' to the 'Naval Agreement Inspection Committee' (which 'kills 3 birds with one stone', since sending them to inspect German shipbuilding not only gets them out of the Country (and thus away from the 'chain of command'), it also allows the Cabinet to see that Churchill is 'following his brief' and finally it gives the Germans (who run rings around them) a 'reassuring' impression of British Naval command (in)competence).

3) Cheap mines sink expensive ships.
Aerial reconnaissance by aircraft from the seaplane carrier HMS Ark Royal HAD discovered a number of new mines on 16 and 17 March, however it seems that no one expected mines to be laid in the shallow water near the shore.

However sea mines are almost totally ineffective - during WW1 tens of thousands were laid in an effort to 'close off' the North sea to almost zero effect. It's impossible to achieve the require density of mines in the open sea. However in narrow coastal waters (and rivers and canals), where the deep channels are strictly limited and ships maneuvering is restricted, mines can be extremely effective. In such waters free floating mines are even easier to spot - however moored mines can be totally invisible until you run into them - as the Allies are about to find out.

On the morning of 18th of March (some 10 days after the crucial mines were laid), three new mines in an area thought to be clear were found and destroyed, however de Robeck (the force commander) was not specifically told - he thus proceeded to follow the exact same course followed before - bombard the defences during the morning and, with his ammunition depleted, retire after lunch in the exact same way as he had been doing for weeks.

On the afternoon of 18th of March, at 13:54, the French battleship Bouvet struck a mine, capsized and sank. At first it seems that de Robeck believed reports that it had been torpedoed, however whatever his thinking, he didn't order any change of course for the rest of the fleet.

Two hours later, following almst the exact same course, the British battle-cruiser Inflexible struck a mine near where Bouvet had sunk, however managed to remain afloat long enough to be beached.

Next it was the turn of the battleship HMS Irresistible to run into a mine - as it drifted off and started to sink, the crew abandoned ship.

A more flexible commander might have reacted differently at this point - irrespective of the cause, even the most ignorant Commander should have realised that the fleet was sailing into danger. But no, they just sailed on ...

Finally, at 18:05, some 4 hours after the first ship hit a mine, it was the turn of the battleship HMS Ocean (following the exact same course as the others) to run into the exact same belt of mines. A mine jammed the steering gear, forcing the crew to abandon ship. It was left to drift, however must have run into further mine(s) as it apparently sunk later that day.

Thus a single line of 20 mines (together with an unimaginative and inflexible commander-in-chief) had cost the Allies 1/3rd of their Battleships (4 out of 12) - if the Ottoman forces had laid another 100 mines they would likely have sunk all 12 ...

In an alternative time-line, the ability to 'think like the enemy' is stressed in the war game courses. Commanders are require to write down "what do you think the enemy is trying to achieve ?" and "what do you think they will do next ?" at various steps during the training - and these notes are used as part of their 'evaluation'.

A 'shore bombardment' game is specifically setup to observe their actions when faced with the possibility of enemy mines, submarines and shore batteries. Half of those taking part don't even bother to send up their 'scouts' or 'ask for intelligence reports' before sending their ships in ..


An "Action Team" is set up to look into expanding the British Submarine arm into more of a 'Fleet Killer' role. In the Dardanelles, the mines that sunk the ships were tethered below the surface = such mines deployed totally unseen (i.e. by Submarine) would likely remain undetected until the enemy actually runs into them.

It doesn't take long to come up with a streamlined 'housing' that can be retro-fitted to the submarines deck. This can be loaded with two dozen mines, each with a 'bottom anchor' and tether (the run length of which can be set from within the submarine just before deployment). The mines can, of course, be deployed whilst the submarine is submerged.

Lessons from the past - The Battle of Jutland, 31 May 1916.

At Jutland the British lost the chance to destroy the German Grand Fleet largely due to the inability of the Navy to obtain (and act on) proper intelligence.

1) Ask the wrong questions, get the wrong answers.
The Navy despised the Intelligence services and the 'liaison' officer especially hated the 'sig. int.' (signals intelligence) arm. Before the German Fleet sailed, the Germans re-assigned the Flagship's 'ID code' to a shore station on the hope of fooling the British - however 'sig. int' recognised the wireless operators 'hand' (Morse timing) and 'spies' reported the departure. However the Navy 'liaison' refused to listen and demanded to know the location of the 'ID code' wireless set. On being told 'in Port' he went away with his already closed mind even firmer shut.

In an alternative time-line, the use of 'intelligence' is added to the war-game courses. A note is made of commanders who 'ask the right questions', those who 'ask the wrong questions' and those (which turn out to be some of the most senior) who 'ask no questions' ...

Churchill convinces the Army and Air-force to set up a joint 'wireless intelligence' unit to focus on breaking German codes. In Aug 1935, a country house in Bletchley is purchased for their use (4 years earlier than historically, which was on 14 August 1939). In order to 'get some practice' they try to break the British and French codes - Churchill is appalled at how easy this proves to be .. changes will have to be made.

In the second half of 1935 he sends some of his best officers on a series of secret missions to Europe to beg for information on German cipher systems. The 'grand tour' starts in France and ends in Poland.

Historically, in 1933, Hans Thilo Schmidt, a German playboy working at the German Cipher Office, is in need of money and sells information to the French secret service. The French, who gave Schmidt the codename Asché, pass this on to the Poles, who have been working on the German system, are now able to complete their reconstruction of the Enigma machine (which is used, at that time, by the German Army)

From 1933 onward, the Poles intercept and decrypt a significant portion of the German radio traffic. In 1938 they see an increase in the number of messages sent by the Germans and it seems clear that Germany is preparing for war.

All this time, the Germans have been using a common Grundstellung (basic setting) for all Enigma traffic. On 15 September 1938 however, this procedure is abandoned. Around the same time, two new wheels (IV and V) are added to the existing three, which multiplies the maximum number of possible settings by a factor of 10. Whilst the Poles deduce the wiring, they can no longer read the messages.

It is only in 1938 that the British GC&CS starts discussing the Enigma machine with the French, from whom they acquire the details provided by the German spy Asché and learn that this has been passed to the Poles.

In January 1939, the first joint Polish-French-British meeting us held in Paris, but the Poles (who have been decoding Enigma but have now run into a brick wall when the Germans modified the machine) have been instructed by their superiors not to disclose any vital information.

On 25-26 July 1939, with the war imminent, the second meeting takes place in Poland and the Poles revealed their achievements and give a replica machine to both the French and the British.

In an alternative time-line, Churchill's officers learn of Asché from the French in late 1935. On visiting Poland they discover that the Poles are breaking the German Army Enigma (which, at that time, was essentially a commercial machine with different wiring and a few 'tweaks') on a regular basis.

The Poles reveal the wiring details of the 3 wheels being used. This allows the British to build their own 'replica' machine. In return the British pass the Poles all they know about the Soviet coding systems which is rather primitive and most of which the Poles already know)

2) It's all about communications.
Having ignored wireless on land, no way was the Navy going to adopt it at sea. 

The British 'reconnaissance' force had a single seaplane carrier which launched a single seaplane. This actually found the German forces, however attempts to relay reports from the aeroplane to the ships failed (the Royal Flying Corps had begun experimenting with "wireless telegraphy" in aircraft since 1912, however the Navy would have none of it - they still communicated with flags and signal lamps - indeed one reason for the fiasco that followed was parts of the fleet getting out of sight of one-another and thus out of communicators range).

After the battle, even the British recognised (in the after-action report) that :-
"For most of the battle, Jellicoe had no idea where the German ships were, even though British ships were in contact. Some of the most important signalling was carried out solely by flag instead of wireless"

Historically, the habit-bound and conservatively minded "professional officers" were allowed to continue on to their path to oblivion (along with everyone else one board) by failing to take advantage of - or even take into account enemy use of - new technology. This blinkered approach persisted up to and into WW 2.

As a result, the British 'reconnaissance' section under Beatty (6 battle-cruisers, 4 fast battleships) first ran into German scouting force (5 battle-cruisers commanded by Franz Hipper) and were then set upon by the rest of the German High Seas Fleet under Scheer (16 battleships and six pre-dreadnought battleships) which was nearby.

By the time the British Grand fleet under Jellicoe (24 battleships and 3 battle-cruisers) arrived, Beatty had lost half his force and the Germans were running for home, where they remained for the rest of the war (by the time WW2 started, every one of these ships was obsolete ...)

In an alternative time-line the 'war game' courses are 'tweaked' to 'discourage' the most inflexible officers (so when they are offered 'promotion' to easier postings ashore they jump at the chance).

Next, Churchill sets up an "Action Team" to address the issue of both ship-to-ship- and ship-to-air communication. One issue is quickly identified - delays caused by the laborious manual use of 'one-time pads' for coding and decoding radio messages are the main reason why signal flags and lamps are used - radio (or, to be exact, the way it is used) is just too slow !

The "Action Team" starts work on an "automatic encoder/decoder" ... and quickly links up with the team at Bletchley (unlike the historical situation, in this time-line the encoders are going to take the advice of the code-breakers)

3) Failure to observe proper precautions when handling explosive charges results in total ship destruction.

At 16:00 on 31 May, a 12 inch shell from Lützow hit Beatty's flagship Lion and wrecked the amidships ("Q") turret. At 16:28, a flash fire ignited th "ready" cordite charges stacked outside the magazine, however the magazine had already been flooded, so the Lion survived.

Three other battle-cruisers, the Indefatigable, Queen Mary, Invincible were not so lucky. Single hits on turrets caused flash fires and magazine explosions. All 3 blew up.

The direct cause of the flash-fire was the cordite 'held ready' in the turret. This was transmitted to the magazine via open doors and open safety 'hatches' that were specifically designed to prevent a 'flash-over'. However these 'safety doors' slowed down the reloading of guns - and the British Navy was fixated on 'rate of fire' (rather than 'accuracy of fire'). To meet the expectations of the C-in-C (Jellicoe) is was common practice to wedge doors open and unlatch safety covers.

Jellicoe was well aware of this, as he later insisted that the problem was due to 'insufficient deck armour' (ignoring the fact that not one enemy shell had penetrated the deck armour)

In an alternative time-line, Churchill adds the need for fast but safe ammunition handling to the Naval Gunfire "Action Team" remit

As with the other Teams, they quickly identify the need for fast 'automatic' systems that out-perform manual handling.

Within a year a method of linking the Magazine to each gun turret by a system of hydraulically operated lifts and conveyor 'belts' with automatic armoured 'blast doors' is devised. Ratings are still needed to select and load the shells and propellant charges at the Magazine end, however the rest of the system is entirely automatic.

After months of exhaustive tests, including 'live fire' exercises (which prove that new 'autoloader' system cannot be beaten by any 'manual' approach), the Battleships of the British Fleet start to be modified. The 2 year program is completed by mid 1938.

4) British 'armour-piercing' shells aren't.
At Jutland, British 'armour-piercing' shells often exploded outside the German armour (rather than penetrating and exploding within). As a result, some German ships with only 8" (20 cm) thick armour survived hits from 15-inch (38 cm) projectiles !

In WW2, the Germans applied 'surface hardening' to their armour - this wasn't discovered until well into WW2 when British anti-tank shells shattered against Panzer armour ...

In an alternative time-line, Churchill adds ammunition development and testing to the Naval Gunfire "Action Team" remit.

They immediately start testing British shells against German armour (previously, tests had only been conducted against British armour :-) ). This reveals the need for shells to have a hardened 'tip' to 'guarantee' penetration.

They also start testing German shells against British armour ... it soon becomes apparent that the same thickness of (flat) British armour is inferior to (sloped) German armour. The 'secret' of sloped armour is soon (re)discovered ... 

Whilst searching for new armour piercing technology, the 'Monroe effect' (shaped charges) and it's 'counter' (the use of 'spaced' armour) is (re)discovered.

Of course, all of the above information is shared with the Army, however they see little use for any of it ..

5) Battle Fleets exist for the sole purpose of opposing other Battle Fleets.
Perhaps the biggest lesson of WW1 was that, after Jutland, the 'Main Battle Fleet', which had been built at massive cost and absorbed huge resources (which could have been better used elsewhere), went largely "unused", it's only real function being to 'bottle up' the enemy Battle Fleet.

A few thousand mines and a few hundred submarines could have done the same job for a fraction of the price (lucky for the Allies, by the time Hitler realised this it was way too late).

When he is appointed on 3 July 1935, Churchill sets up a Team to look into ways and means of eliminating the German "Battle Fleet" without the need to built ever more bigger and more expensive British Battleships. He especially asks them to look into the possibility of using Naval Air-power ....

One of it's first recommendations is for a massive increase in the long range (long endurance) British Submarine Fleet. However this comes with a 'note' that it is vital to keep this secret from the Nazi's (since they would undoubtedly start to take counter-measures - and worse, might themselves switch priority to U-boats)

Naval Air power

Historically, :-
1) on 19 July 1918, seven Sopwith Camels launched from HMS Furious attacked the German Zeppelin base at Tondern, with two 50lb (23 kg) bombs each. This was the world's first ever carrier-launched air strike. No planes were lost in the attack, however the carrier had no method of recovering the aircraft, so two of the pilots ditched their aircraft in the sea alongside the carrier whilst the others headed for (neutral) Denmark.
2) in September 1918, HMS Argus became the world's first full-length flat deck carrier. The is the first aircraft carrier that allowed aircraft to take off from and then return to, and land on, the actual ship.

However after the end of WW1, in 1919 the Naval Air Service is disbanded and it's aircraft handed over to the RAF. Only in 1937 did the Navy start to advertise for trainee pilots for a new Naval Air Service.

In the alternative time-line, when Churchill is appointed First Sea Lord on 3 July 1935 he immediately starts talks with the RAF for the 're-activation' of the Naval Air Service - however, as with Hitler and his 'glider schools' Churchill does not want the Germans to learn of his preparations.

A 'cover stroy' is quickly agreed with the RAF - Navy pilots will train in RAF uniforms at RAF airfields (a special short runway with arrester wires will be used to train for Carrier landings).

The 'cover story' is that this is a 'secret trial' of a new 'instant build airfield' system (hence the short runways) and that the pilots are being trained for service on British islands overseas where no existing runways exist and where limited space is available to build one (hence the arrester wires).

Historically, in the winter of 1936, unemployed ship workers from Jarrow march on London

In the alternative time-line, by end of 1935 Churchill has convinced the Government of the dangers of communism brewing amongst the unemployed. There is a real fear of revolution led by unemployed shipbuilders from Tyneside and Clydeside - so when Churchill puts forward a plan in Jan 1936 to start building new Navy ships, Baldwin backs him. Ititially this will be for corvettes that are described to the Press as 'new Customs inspection' craft.

Soon, the few Battleships still under construction are being converted into Aircraft Carriers. All planned Battleship, Fast Battleship and Heavy Cruiser orders are cancelled - the resources freed will be used to build submarines and 'convoy protection' vessels (including a new 'Convoy Carrier' design).

In summer of 1936, as Hitler lords it over the Berlin Olympics, the Jarrow shipyards lay down the keels of 6 brand-new Fleet Carriers ('through deck' flat-tops with an extra long run-way). Plans call for all 6 to be ready 'by mid 1940'.

The length of the keel and some carefully planted mis-information ensures the British Press praises the building of "a new generation of Super-Battleship" equipped with "4 20" guns in two turrets, 6 18" guns in a further 2 turrets and 4 16" guns in a 5th turret". These ships will 'replace all existing Battleships' and, to keep within Treaty tonnage limits, 'will be lightly armoured and reply on speed and gun range to avoid the enemy'. They "will guarantee protection of Britain's world-wide interests into the 1960's".

A dozen small 'escort carriers' are also started. As the first two are laid down, Churchill holds a press conference to announce "Our two new 'state-of-the-art' Seaplane Carriers, capable of carrying move than a dozen/b> aircraft to provide reconnaissance and target spotting for the new Super-Battleship Fleet".

'Artists impression' drawings show float equipped biplanes taking off from a rather odd looking 'hybrid' of battleship and aircraft carrier. The front half of the ship is a shortish runway deck that extends over a 3 gun front turret. The rear half has a superstructure with a high-set front facing 3 gun turret (set over what what could be a pair of hanger doors) and 2 rear facing turrets. The back of the ship has two large crains, one on each side of a small 'landing deck' outside what looks like a large hanger entrance. It is accompanied by a dozen 5 turreted Battleships. A 50 mile arc is show inscribed '20" Gun range' and a 100 mile arc inscribed 'scouting range'.

All of the above nonsense is read with great interest in both Berlin and Tokyo (a messenger to the American President verbally informs him of the truth after reaching an agreement that nothing will be written down or discussed with others over the phone - at the same time he is warned that the 'US diplomatic Radio cypher is not secure').

Other shipyards are busy building new submarines and convoy protection corvettes. A Press Release issued by the Department of Fisheries announces the expansion of the British fishing fleet with experimental new 'purpose built long-endurance ocean going super trawlers' that will 'tow innovative underwater storage tanks' where 'live fish will be stored to keep them fresh during the voyage'. These go largely unnoticed and unreported.

The Jarrow marches never take place = no-one wants to take a week off work !

The length of an Aircraft Carrier runway limits the size/weight of aircraft that can sucessfully use it to take off (arrrester wires ensure successful landing). Whilst the Carrier can 'turn into the wind' and 'increase to maximium speed' to assist with take-off (and landings), a limit is soon reached. Extra large flaps can be used to reduce take-pff speed, however these always increase drag and that compromises performance (as a rule of thumb, a reduction in take-off speed = reduction in maximium speed). The heavier the aircraft, the longer the runway needed to get up to speed.

Churchill wants his Carriers to support aircraft big enough to carry airborne Radar and a sufficient weight of depth charges to attack U-boats. That almost certainly needs a large twin-engined airframe. Ideally he wants to use a standard aircraft with minor modifications (such as fitting of arrester hook) in order to take advantage of mass production. He sets up an 'Action Team' to look into the problem. It doesn't take long for some-one to point out that, during WW1, 'spotter' biplanes were launched from Battleships by catapult - so why not do the same on an Aircraft Carrier ? Ground tests soon show that this is indeed feasible. The initial plan is for catapults to be added to the end of the existing runway - however it is soon realised that the opportunity exists to 'solve' a weakness of Carriers - the fact that aircraft can't take off and land at the same time. When aircraft are being landed, the carrier is vulnerable .. the single large lift at the end of the runway can move 2 single engined or one two engined aircraft at a time but the hanger deck is not designed for aircraft to be moved in different directions at the same time. So, in 1937, the deck design of the Fleet Carriers is modified by the addition of a 'cross runway' equipped with a steam powered catapult. This will allow two single engined aircraft or a single twin engined aircraft to be launched, even when the 'main' runway is being used for landings. A second lift is added that allows aircraft to be bought up from the middle of the hanger deck to the capapult runway.

Navy Anti-aircraft guns

Churchill is well aware of the dangers of low-level (torpedo, dive-bomber) aircraft attack on Navy vessels = indeed, he is planning sink the German Navy in that exact way ! He sets up an Action Team to look into the air-defence of Navy ships. The Team immediately reports the abysmal state of (non-)protection of most Navy ships. Some have no AA at all, whilst the typical Destroyer has only one or two AA gun mounts at most. Some Navy ships can't even 'elevate' their AA guns sufficiently to fire at dive bombers at all ! None of the guns has any sort of 'predicting' gun-sight !! The Team is given the job of coming up with a (powered) AA gun turret that can be 'retro-fitted' to existing ships 'at the dock side' (i.e. without the need for a return to a shipyard). A new twin-barrel and new quad-barrel 6pdr (40mm) 'auto-gun' AA mount is designed with an 'analogue' predicting gun-sight. The mount can be mass produced in a factory away from the docks. This first 'retro fit' kits are soon shipped and replacement of the existing 40mm AA guns starts in Jan 1936. A 5 year plan aims to bring each 'capital' ship up to 6 quad mounts with proportionally less fitted to each other ship (down to a pair of dual mounts to Frigates and Gunboats), however events will derail this plan within half that time.

Naval Radar Historically :- During WW1, in 1917 the German U-boat campaign almost won the war for Germany. To counter the U-boats, the "convoy system" was introduced and the British developed ASDIC (Sonar) which was capable of detecting submerged U-boats, when WW1 ended the U-boat threat was almost totally forgotten and the further development of ASDIC shelved. In November 1934, the Air Ministry established the "Committee for the Scientific Survey of Air Defence (CSSAD)" with the official function of considering "how far recent advances in scientific and technical knowledge can be used to strengthen the present methods of defence against hostile aircraft". Commonly called the "Tizard Committee" after its Chairman, Sir Henry Tizard. On February 12, 1935, a secret report titled "The Detection of Aircraft by Radio Methods" is submitted to the Air Ministry by Watson Watt. On February 26, 1935, a Handley Page Heyford bomber was successfully detected. In mid-May 1935, a purpose built system consisting of six wooden towers were erected, two for stringing the transmitting antenna, and four for corners of crossed receiving antennas. In June, general testing of the equipment began and on June 17, the first target was detected—a Supermarine Scapa flying boat at 17 mi (27 km) range. The system worked - and in December 1935, the British Treasury appropriated £60,000 for a five-station system called Chain Home (CH). At this time, no-one seems to have understood the implications for detecting vessels at sea - and especially for detecting surfaced U-boats at night.

Churchill is well aware of how close Britain came to defeat in 1917. So one of his first acts on being appointed First Sea Lord (on 3 July 1935) is to set up an "Action Team" whose task is to discover and perfect a means of eliminating German U-boats in the event of another war. He is also well aware of the "Tizard Committee", the success of the tests and the Treasury discussions (which will last 6 months) on financing the Chain Home system. He asks the Team if the system can be used from ships to detect other ships and submarines (on the surface). The quickly come back with some recommendations :- a) 'Prevention is better than cure'. Immediately war is declared, UK will have a 'one off' chance to destroy the shipyards where U-boats are built and destroy the docks where U-boats are launched and repaired before the Nazi's realise the danger. We should mine the approaches to all ports from which U-boats operate and use British Submarines to enforce the 'economic blockade'. b) Air-to-Surface Radar (ASV) is indeed practical and a Team led by Bowen has already started work on it - at Churchill's urging this effort will be supported by the Navy c) Upon detection, by whatever means, the U-boat can be assumed to dive to escape (a trained U-boat crew can crash-dive in 30 seconds). It is vital to develop a means of tracking and attacking the U-boat underwater (the existing ASDIC plus 'depth charges' being too crude and inaccurate) d) A new type of Navy ship needs to be designed for Convoy protection from the U-boat. Unlike existing types, it will focus on U-boat hunting and destruction (rather than sailing around in circles watching the cargo ships being torpedoed and burning and sinking). e) British ocean-going submarines may be slow underwater, but (like the U-boats) they can keep up with a convey on the surface. If the U-boat can be detected on the surface, an opportunity exists for the British Submarines to submerge, 'creep up on them' and sink them before they can dive. Churchill immediately sets up Action Teams to address each point, especially the destruction of U-boat construction yards and docks, the detection and attacking of U-boats and a Team to design the new 'U-boat hunter' ship. Point (e) is noted but he feels that avoiding 'friendly fire' will lead to so much confusion that the U-boat will likely escape. However it does give him an idea for decoy or 'ghost' convoys .. It is immediately obvious that the assistance of the RAF will be needed to carry out precision bomber strikes against U-boat construction facilities. So Churchill decides to find out what they are capable of. He presents the RAF with an old WW1 Battleship at anchor off the East Coast and invites them to sink it with their high-level bombers. Despite many claims of 'direct hits', each time the 'damage inspection team' boards after an attack, they find no damage to report ! Against the wishes of many bomber pilots, squadron commanders fit cameras that are 'triggered' to record bomb drops. Despite continuing claims of 'direct hits' it soon becomes apparent that no bomb is getting within 100 yards of the target. Worse, on days with any sort of low, medium, or high level cloud, many of the bombers are unable to actually find the target and are dropping their bombs on fishing boats, dingies, rock formations, low level cloud banks and even wave shadows in the open sea ! It is soon discovered that the RAF navigates 'by map' - specifically, by following features such as rivers that can be visually identified form the air. Navigation over water is by compass and 'dead reckoning'. The effects of cross wind has to be 'estimated' and accounted for manually. Even when they manage to get near to the target co-ordinates, even in perfect weather from 20,000 feet it's almost impossible to pick out a target as small as a Battleship with the naked eye. Even when it is found, the bomb-sights are simply not accurate enough to get the bombs onto the target. The RAF is so embarrassed that senior commanders suppress the 'after action' reports (in exactly the same way the Senior Commanders of all 3 Services do when their 'received wisdom' claims are disproved by the facts). However some of the more 'forward thinking' squadron commanders 'leak' the reports to Churchill, who gets up in the House (where he can't be questioned on the source of the reports) and reads them out verbatim. The press has a field day. Soon changes are being made to the RAF command structure. Attempts are made to improve navigation training but it soon becomes obvious that significant technical improvements are needed. Efforts also start on technical solutions to the bombing (in)accuracy issue. In this alternative time-line, the RAF will soon come to focus on precision attacks = they will never have to resort to 'city busting' (and the advocates of such a policy will be ignored).

The Day One strike plan

An 'action team' is set up to plan 'day 1' of the war. It's goal is to 'take out' not only the U-boats but the entire German Navy on the same day that war is declared. With the Kriegsmarire sunk, an economic blockade of Germany will be enforced. This will start with the sinking of the entire German merchant navy, where-ever they are in the world. The final task given to the 'Action Team' is to propose ways to 'cripple' any Germany ships that 'escape' the planned 'first strike'. The first step is to discover the location of each Germany capital ship and 'track' it's movements (you can't 'hit' a target unless you know where it is -:) ) A "Naval Targets" index is set up at Bletchley Park. Starting with the capital ships, it doesn't take long to identify every Kriegsmarine vessel equipped with a radio (i.e. all of them) by name. As time passes, the 'history' of each ship is filled in - where they are based, where they go, where they are now. By 1938 the radio intercept staff know the 'hand' of the radio operators of every German capital ship so well that their positions can be plotted on the 'Naval Map Room' tables in virtual 'real time' (i.e. without even decoding the transmissions !).

The Circus

Of course in peace time, there is not as much 'traffic' as there would be in war - many of the ships are simply sitting in port. So it doesn't take long to track down each and every ship of the Kriegsmarine. From mid 1937, each time Churchill phones through and asks about a specific ship he gets an almnost instant answer. When he asks for a list of ships in a specific port there is aways some delay before he gets a comprehensive answer. When he asks more general questions - 'where are the German Battleships ?' there is a longer delay and when he asks questions like 'which Kriegsmarine ships are in the North sea ?' they often have to call him back. Then, suddenly, in January 1938, instead of a delay he starts getting instant and comprehensive answers to his every question. After he gets an instant answer to the question 'What U-boats are currently in the North Sea within 100 miles of Scapa Flow ?' he starts to wonder how they are looking up the details so fast. Then, in mid 1938, when he gets an immediate list of German ships 'nearest to the HMS Royal Oak battlegroup', along with their general course and speed, he decides to go visit and find out how they are doing it. As he leaves London by train, he suddenly realises that he hadn't given them the HMS Royal Oak's current position ! On arrival at Bletchley, he is shown into the 'Navy Index' room, where, he is told, they have details of over 5,000 German ships = the entire Kriegsmarine and almost all their merchant navy. The walls are filled with filing cabinets. One wall is an Index of ships by name, on the second cabinets of ports by name and locations at sea. The staff explain that when a 'location update' is phoned through, they first look up the ship in the name index. This gives them the current location allowing them find it's duplicate entry in the second set of cabinets. They update both records, moving the duplicate entry to a new location as necessary. He is most impressed with the system, which seems to answer all his questions. They must be really fast at looking up all those details, he thinks, especially given the relatively few staff in evidence. He is then taken to lunch in the Manor House - however as he arrives in the dinning room he spots a massive circus tent on the lawn outside the windows. This, he is told, is where the 'other ranks' take their meals. Never one to 'separate himself from the troops', he suggest they switch lunch to the tent. The Index room staff try to disuade him, however he insists - and demands to know 'why not ?'. Eventually they confess that the tent is also used for 'staff hobbies and after-work games' and wonders what they are doing that is so 'sensitive'. As he enters the tent he notes the dozens of table tenis tables against left side and far wall and dozens of tea trollies spread out over the center of the tent - so, they are a bit untidy, but that's nothing to hide. He joins the queue at the sanwidtch tables and tea urns to the right. As he is picking up a sandwitch, a loudspeaker bursts into life :- ring ring, ring ring, click - Map Room and is aghast to see the positions of Royal Navy ships laid out for all to see - and when he discovers that the positions have been plotted from radio intercepts he is totally horrified ! What if the Germans are doing this ??? Inside are dozens of table-tennis tables adding the positions of Royal Navy Ships. Next they generate a list of 'targets' that need to be 'hit' to prevent the Germans repairing or replacing their ships. This, of course, consists of a long list of docks and shipyards. Of course extensive mine-fields and British submarines can be used to 'interdict' any ships entering or leaving German ports, however some ships will undoubtedly escape. But it doesn't take too long to identify the 'Achilles heel' of the German navy - fuel. Fuel production, refinement and storage is immediately added to the list of 'priority targets' for the 'day 1' strike ...

Natural oil was available in Northwestern Germany at Nienhagen (55%—300,000 tons per year), Rietberg (20%—300,000), and Heide (300,000) and the refineries were mainly at Hamburg and Hannover.

The port of Hamburg is already a priority target - it's where the majority of the German capital ships are built and based. But it will be hard to hit - it is a sea port on the river Elbe about 110km (68 miles) from its mouth on the North Sea. However this also makes it easy to 'embargo' by seeding the Elbe with mines. Hannover is even further inland (on the River Leine), however it is a major industrial area and plainly a vital part of Nazi war effort - and only about 400 miles from British airfields in Norfolk. Neither city can be bombarded from the sea by Churchill's own planned 'day one' Naval attack, so in early 1937 Churchill swallows his pride, approaches the Air Chief Marshal and asks to see their planned operations 'for the first day of war'. He hopes to get facilities, factories and oil storage in Hamburg and Hannover (and other priority Naval targets) onto their 'hit list'. He is appalled to discover that Bomber Command has no plans what-so-over ... indeed, half the officers have their heads firmly in the sand, either convinced that if they make no plans, then a war can't start, or that there is no point in making plans now because war is at least 10 years away (and any plans made now will be out-of-date). The prevailing attitude of the rest is one of 'we have to wait for the bombers to be built' followed by 'and then wait to be told what to do with them' !! When he brings up the concept of forming a 'priority target list', he is told that Prime Minister Chamberlain has issued strict orders to the RAF that, in the event of war, they are not to bomb private property !!

Historically, :- The first raid on Hannover was 4 September 1939, the day after the British declaration of war – and it involved just one RAF Armstrong Whitworth Whitley dropping leaflets !! Then nothing until :- 19 May 1940 - the RAF bombed the Misburg refineries, killing nineteen people. 1st August 1940 - the first raid on Hannover city (the Seilerstraße in the south of the city). 30 September 1940 - six planes destroy several buildings in Wülfel and Linden. 10 February 1941 - the city is raided by 220 British planes, mainly hitting the eastern district and killing 101 people. then on the night of 15/16 April on the Vahrenwald and Hainholz Finally, on 15/16 June 1941 the Bomber Command actually targets the VLW-Werk factory and the Misburg refineries (with their usual lack of success) It takes Bomber Command two years before they try again, by which time they have given uo trying to hit actual Targets .. On 26 July 1943 a mass raid destroys the city center ...

In the alternative time-line Churchill convinces Bomber Command to setup a 'Study Team' to make 'contingency plans' and 'a theoretical list of targets'. He suggests that Squadron Commanders take part in paper 'training exercises' (wargames) - and since the RN (Royal Navy) already has Training Centers setup, Churchill offers the use of them to Bomber Command. This undermines the 'objectiors' and from the start of 1938, the RAF will take part in 'war-games' in which they plan attacks on 'theoretical targets'. RN 'umpires' play the part of the German 'defenders', using the most up to date data on German air defences. Since the games are run by the RN, some of the first targets are major German port and ship-building facilities. The 'Hannover game' is left to last - it's the hardest target to reach and requires the most detailed planning. One lesson all the Squadron Commanders leave with is that a 'mass attack' as soon as possible after the declaration of war is likely to achieve the maximum of surprise and result in the minimum of losses. Needless to say, all the plans are recorded in great detail by Navy Air Command Officers who just happen to be present as 'observers'. This is noted by the more observant of the Squadron Commanders who realise that, in the event of war, the 'theoretical' is likely to become 'actual' very quickly ...

The "Battleship Bomb"

Churchill is aware that ships are at their most vulnerable when moored in a port and within range of (land-based) bombers which is why the British Home Fleet is based in Scapa Flow in Orkney, well out of range of any aircraft flying from the continent. In 1935, he is already formulating a plan to attack every capital ship of the Kriegsmarine that can be found in port on the day that War is declared. Of course, Aircraft Carriers will mean that no port is 'out of range', however the expectation is that Carrier aircraft will attack enemy ships at sea with torpedo bombers. Plainly, when in port, only a truly incompetent enemy will moor their ships in such a position that they can be attacked by torpedoes (which have to be launched into deepish water some distance from their targets) - and in ports where no suitable 'protected' anchorage exists, only the criminally incompetent would fail to deploy anti-torpedo nets. So, to attack ships in port, it's obvious that bombs will have to be used - and it soon becomes apparent that the existing British 'High Explosive' bomb will be of little use against armoured targets (even though the deck and turret roof armour of warships is far thiner than the hull and turret sides). Churchill expands the "Naval shells and armour Action Team" to look into the design and use of armour-piercing bombs against enemy ships. The Action Team soon approaches various British aircraft manufacturing companies and asks them to make available any of their scientific staff that might be able to contribute to advanced bomb design. In early 1936 a young engineer from Vickers Aircraft, the author of a just written paper entitled "A Note on a Method of Attacking the Axis Powers" (which proposes the design and deployment of a 10,000 pound 'earthquake' bomb (this was historically written in 1939)) joins the Team = his name is Barnes Wallis.

Blocade

The blockade is generally considered to have been one of the main causes of the defeat of Germany in the First World War.[10] Second World War The Northern Patrol (North Sea) was reactivated on 6 September 1939, three days after the start of the Second World War. Its area of operations was more extensive than during the First World War and included the areas north of Scotland and Ireland, between the north of Scotland and Norway, around the Shetlands, the Faeroe Islands and Iceland, and the Denmark Strait between Iceland and Greenland.[11] As in the First World War, older cruisers from the reserve fleet made up the original units of the new Northern Patrol: 4 C class and 4 D class light cruisers, the slightly larger light cruiser Effingham is flagship, and for a short time the two light cruisers of the E class.[12] However, armed merchant cruisers soon supplanted and replaced those.[13] As in the First World War, warships from the Home Fleet or other commands were sometimes temporary attached to the Northern Patrol.

Convoy protection

In the alternative time-lone, Churchill's 'Action team' soon reports on the inability of most Navy ships to even 'detect' submarines, let alone 'attack' them. Sending a couple of Battleships - or even half-a-dozen Destroyers - out to 'protect' convoys will be both ineffective and a useless waste of resources. What's needed is many more smaller, specialist, 'U-boat hunter' craft. They come up with a new design for a corvette sized vessel capable of crossing the Atlantic along with the convoy. It will need to be equipped with a means of detecting U-boats on both the surface and submerged, during both at night and day. It will also need a means of attacking and destroying a detected U-boat. It is soon realised that surface detection and attack will need advances in Radar - and submerged detection and attack will require advances in ASDIC. Work starts immediately on a new 'direction and depth' ASDIC capable of giving not only the current direction, distance and depth of the U-boat but also how it is moving. Since it is assumed that a U-boat will dive as soon as it is detected, focus is on underwater attack. Work starts on a 'calculating engine' (based on existing bomb-sights) to predict the fall of depth-charges. When the 'calculating engine' is coupled to the new ASDIC it will direct the ships course and automatically set the 'trigger' depth of the depth charges. Depth charges will then be released automatically as the ship passes over the calculated future position of the U-boat. Of course much of the planned equipment will take time to develop, however work on building the hulls can start immediately. The Anti-U-boat Team does not rest - they continue to look for new means of U-boat detection and new ways of destroying them. It doesn't take long to come up with the idea of the acoustic homing torpedo. Initially this will 'listen' for the sound of a surfaced boats diesel engines or the return 'ping' of a ship's ASDIC (and home in on that). Further, it's plain that using the massive 'Battleship killer' 21" Torpedo against a U-boat is not only massive 'over kill' but actually impractical = on the surface the U-boat draft is so shallow that the 'Battleship killer' torpedo will just pass straight under it without exploding. Work starts on the design of a new, smaller, more shallow running torpedo specifically intended for use against surfaced U-boats. To ensure the torpedo explodes even if it passes under the U-boat, work on a 'magnetic trigger' is started. The diameter of the new torpedo will be small enough to allow 3 to be packed into a standard 21" British submarine torpedo tube. This will allow it's use against both U-boats and 'un-armoured' surface ships (such as German merchant ships)

Historically, in 1937, Bowen's team used the world's first airborne radar receiver set (ASV) to detect the Home Fleet 'illuminated' by CH transmitters in poor weather. However, historically, this first successful use of an air-borne radar receiver was largely ignored. Indeed, it was only in the spring of 1939 (when it became apparent that the searchlight based "Silhouette" system was actually incapable of detecting night attackers) did attention turn to using ASV for air-to-air interception.

In an alternative time-line, Churchill will seize upon the success of Bowen's team and the 'ASV set' to push forward it's development for Naval scout planes. Navy ships will be fitted with transmitters (to provide the necessary 'ground station' radar) whilst smaller sets are developed. Effort is also put into using larger aircraft as Naval scout planes (to get a combination of 'small enough radar' with 'big enough plane' as soon as possible) A goal is set for Radar to be retro-fitted to all Royal Navy ships, starting with the Battleships and ending with Frigates, by 1940, allowing them to detect the enemy in poor weather and at night. Soon an Action Team will be developing a "radar guided gun laying engine" to automatically aim and fire at an unseen enemy (in poor weather and at night). As radar sets are improved, they will be used to 'illuminate' U-boats on the surface (even at night) and allow both land-based and carrier based 'submarine killer' aircraft to 'home in' on them. Eventually Radar transmitters will become small enough to be fitted to aircraft, allowing radar to be used for the detection of enemy ships (and surfaced U-boats) by carrier scout planes.

Historically :- By 1938, Navy treaty limits were effectively being ignored by everyone. The re-armament of the Royal Navy was well under way by this point; the Royal Navy had begun construction of the still treaty-affected and undergunned new battleships and its first full-sized purpose-built aircraft carriers. In addition to new construction, several existing old battleships (whose gun power offset to a significant extent the weakly armed new battleships), battlecruisers and heavy cruisers were reconstructed, and anti-aircraft weaponry reinforced, while new technologies, such as ASDIC, Huff-Duff and hydrophones, were developed. The Navy had lost control of naval aviation when the Royal Naval Air Service was merged with the Royal Flying Corps to form the Royal Air Force in 1918, but regained control of ship-board aircraft with the return of the Fleet Air Arm to Naval control in 1937 At the start of the Second World War in 1939, the Royal Navy was the largest in the world, with over 1,400 vessels, including:- 7 aircraft carriers - with 5 more under construction 15 battleships and battlecruisers - with 5 more under construction 66 cruisers - with 23 more under construction 184 destroyers - with 52 under construction 45 escort and patrol vessels - with 9 under construction and one on order 60 submarines - with 9 under construction

In the alternatie time-line, by 1939 the Royal navy has :- 6 Fleet Carriers - with 6 more under construction 10 Escort Carriers (6 converted WW1 battleships and battlecruisers, 4 purpose builds) with 5 more under construction 12 battleships and battlecruisers - with no more under construction 10 WW1 vintage 'Dreadnaughts', upgraded with radar fire control and automatic ammunition handling systems (for use in a shore bombardment role) 66 cruisers - with no more under construction 184 destroyers - with no more under construction 250 corvettes - with 56 more under construction 45 other escort and patrol vessels - with no more under construction 260 submarines - with 90 more under construction The https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vickers_Wellington At this time,
It doesn't take long to work out that one hit from such a massive bomb will be enough to 'knock out' even the biggest Battleship - however the focus then shifts to ensuring the 'one hit'. The problem is that to achieve sufficient velocity to pierce armour, the bomb will have to be dropped from 20,000 feet or above - and from that height the atmospheric turbulence will push the bomb off-course. Despite some promising work with gyroscopic control of the bomb stabiliser fins, it is very quickly realised that only a 'guided' bomb is going to do the job. The focus then shifts to radar and infra-red detection of ships, however whilst this appears 'easy' at sea (when the 'target' ship is likely well separated from any other object that might provide a 'distraction') it's far from easy in Port. What's needed is something that can distinguish a chosen target from surrounding objects - which more or less implies some sort of visual system. It doesn't take long for some-one to mention the BBC trials of 240 lines resolution television broadcasts (starting 2 November 1936). John Logie Baird joins the team as an adviser - it looks like his mechanical 'camera' is just what's needed to guide the bomb. The Baird 'telecine' camera system is a film scanning system. This was used (at 25 frames a second) to transmit 'live' TV = the film of the studio 'actors' was developed at high speed. The Baird camera then scanned the (still wet) film frames, leading to a two minute delay from action to transmission. When Baird realises that the BBC will drop his 240 line system in favour of EMI’s 405-lines, he agrees to join the 'bomb guidance' Team full time.

Historically, BBC broadcasts starting on 2 November 1936 switched between the Marconi-EMI system and its ‘Emitron’ live transmission cameras, and the Baird ‘intermediate film’ system on alternative days. Within days it was obvious to all that the Baird system was doomed (it was only ever used at the insistence of the Post Office who wanted an 'all British' solution). Baird appears to have paid no part in WW2 (other than perhaps assisting with training films for Radar operators), so having him on a 'bomb guidance' Team will have no negative effects elsewhere.

The Action Team is well aware that the 'problem' with accurate bombing is that the higher the altitude from which the bomb is dropped the harder it is to get it 'one target'. However to achieve any degree of 'armour piercing', the bomb must be travelling at 500mph or more when it hits the target. What is needed is a method of 'terminal guidance' .. Baird soon comes up with the answer - an optical 'matching' system that corrects the bombs flight as it drops. By end of 1937 the first 'half-sized' (4,500 lb) prototype is ready. The 'bomb' has stubby wings and a tail = indeed it looks more like a small aircraft than a bomb. A Baird mechanical sensor has been coupled to a "Course Setting Bomb Sight" which in turn is linked to the wings and tail control surfaces.

The Course Setting Bomb Sight (CSBS) is a basic site that corrected for drift. It was developed for the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) in order to attack submarines and ships and was first introduced in 1917. It is not particularly accurate for high level bombing, but 'gets the job done' at low level. Whilst outdated by the mid 1930's (by the US 'Norden' Tachometric type of bombsight) Vector bomb-sights continued as the main bomb-sight in British service until 1942 (and no doubt contributed to Bomber Commands inability to hit anything with bombs dropped from high level)

A telescopic lens is fitted to the nose of the bomb. This projects an image through the bomb sight. As they approaches the target, a Baird 240 line scanner sends a live image to a TV screen in the parent aircraft. The bomb aimer in the parent aircraft instructs the pilot to maneuvers so as to get the target into the cross-hairs. When the target is in the cross hairs, the bomb aimer presses a button. This takes a photo and releases the bomb. As the bomb is released, an internal 100 second self-destruct timer is activated (the bomb is 'armour piercing' = if it drops into soft earth or mud it's quite possible the impact will not be violent enough to cause it to detonate). The bomb 'free falls' (or, to be more exact, 'free glides') for the first 15 seconds (about half the 'time to target' when dropped from 20,000 feet) whilst the photo negative is developed. The gilde angle soon exceeds 45 degrees (the wings and tail are there to guide the bomb onto the target, not to extend it's range). Then the Baird 'targeting system' takes over. The negative is 'matched up' to the 'live view' through the bomb sight (zoom lenses keep the relative views correctly magnified). When an 'exact' match occurs, the live-view will be exactly blocked by the negative. A series of rotating lenses shifts the incoming live view as the system seeks the 'minimum'. The bomb's control surfaces are adjusted so as to keep the target (minimum light intensity) centered. Accuracy depends on the quality of the 'target photo' and 'live view' through the nose lens, so this limits the system to daylight and almost perfect visibility. However it is quickly realised that the 'target photo' could be taken by a reconnaissance aircraft days before the actual bomb run. So long as the bomber approaches the target at the same angle as the reconnaissance aircraft (and the Germans have not made significant changes to what was in the target area) and the bomb-aimer releases the bomb when the 'live view' matches the target photo, then a bomb could even be dropped through partial cloud (so long as the cloud is 'cleared' within the first 15 seconds of the bombs flight) Of course, during the 'attack run', as it 'lines up' on the target, the parent aircraft will be vulnerable to fighters - and (at least in theory) it's even possible that the 'glider bomb' could be shot down (although after 15 seconds it will be moving at over 400 mph, reaching 500 mph is it impacts the target) So next the Team start work on developing a system that can be used (against enemy ships) at night.

Historically :- Photographic emulsions from Kodak and other manufacturers are developed during the early 1930's for infrared astronomy. During the 1930's, the Times regularly published landscape and aerial photographs taken by their staff photographers using Ilford infrared film.

During 1938, an infrared guidance system enters developement. It's an easy matter to replace the Baird sensor with one sensitive to infrared radiation. The 'nose lens' is now 6" in diameter - and this gives the bomb-aimer a view of the target at night - and, it is soon discovered, even through light cloud ! What's more, it's soon discovered that warships really show up well against cold black water ! The system is stripped down to the absolute basics. The 6" zoom lens, bomb-sight and Baird infrared scamner is moved to the parent aircraft. The photgraphic parts are eliminated. The bomb aimer in the parent triggers the release when he spots the target on his TV screen. The bomb guidance system will then 'home' on whatever single 'bright' (warm) object is found nearest the center of it's field of view when it is dropped. Of course this system can't be used when friends are in the same area - however it's ideal for use against ships (or surfaced U-boats) at night. With no Radar emissions to 'give away' the fact that they have been discovered, and a bomb modified with larger wings (so further glide distance) the parent aircraft can avoid 'over flying' the target. In early 1939, the system is fitted to the Short S25 Sunderland flying boat (which has been in service since 1937 and has a mximum bombload of 4,960lb. It can achieve 217 mph, has a range of 2,961 miles and a Service Ceiling of 17,864 feet (3.38 miles). A glide bomb released from a height of 3 miles on a 45 degree glide path will travel about 4.25 miles to it's target, taking less than a miniute.

Tall Boy dropped from 25,000ft strikes at 1260ft/s BUT at an angle of 16 degrees. While the table does not specify this it must be 16 degrees from vertical. Thus we have a right triangle where 1260 is the hypotenuse. This resolves itself into two motions a vertical (y) and a horizontal (x) velocity. Using trig functions: sin(16) = x / 1260 or x = 347ft/s (236 mph) and cos(16) = 1211ft/s (826 mph) which is still supersonic. Time to target is about 39s. The Lancaster could not reach the design height of the (grand-slam ? Tallboy ?), which was 30-40,000 ft ? In practice, the Tallboy was dropped from an optimal altitude of 18,000 ft at a forward speed of 170 mph. Impacting at 750 mph . Not supersonic. The Bielefeld viaduct was attacked from only 12,000 feet. One Grand Slam dropped by Squadron Leader Calder did what over 3000 tons of conventional bombs had failed to do. The time recorded for the fall of the bomb was 35 seconds though I have no idea how accurate that might be. The Short Stirling was born from an RAF requirement set forth in 1936 calling for a heavy four-engined bomber with suitable range and a lethal payload carrying capability. By 1938, a half-sized prototype was flying with a full-size prototype being delivered for testing in 1939. The rather conventional design made use of a forward-set flight deck, centralized internal bomb bay and tricycle undercarriage. Wings were straight and low-mounted with each assembly managing two leading edge engine nacelles. Each engine powered a three-bladed propeller. The undercarriage was retractable with the main legs left rather tall giving the Stirling bomber a rather noticeable nose-up profile when landed. The tail section was traditional, showcasing a single vertical tail fin flanked by two low-mounted horizontal planes. Typical crew accommodations included seven personnel made up of two pilots, a navigator/bombardier, nose gunner, flight engineer and two dedicated gunners. Defensive armament was 8 x 7.7mm (0.303 caliber) machine guns - 2 x in a powered nose turret, 2 x in a powered dorsal turret and 4 x in a powered tail turret. Offensively, the bomber could carry upward of 14,000lbs of internal stores. Designed from the outset as a four-engined heavy bomber (most RAF four engine bombers began life as twin-engined designs), the Stirling would reach its stride in the early 1940's through the Mk III variant as this proved the definitive principle bomber. Short Stirlings were fielded across twenty-eight total RAF bomber squadrons and certainly left their mark on the war despite the arrival of more famous mounts such as the Avro Lancaster. By 1940, the Stirling was in serial production and entered operational service the following year. In its original Mk I form, the Stirling was powered by 4 x Bristol Hercules XI radial piston engines and it would be this mark that would be available during the critical war years - holding enough range to reach the German capital of Berlin if required. The Mk II model followed in prototype form and was fitted with 4x Wright Cyclone engines - though never produced. As such, the definitive Mk III followed with its 4 x Bristol Hercules XVI powerplants and would become the principle bomber variant in the Stirling series. The Mk III series was further fitted with specialized "Pathfinder" equipment, making it useful in airborne-related paratrooper operations or directing follow-up bomber formations to the proper target in low-light. The Avro Lancaster went on to become the most important British heavy bomber or World War 2. Interestingly, its success was born from the failure of the Avro Manchester bomber - a twin-engined heavy bomber first flown in July of 1939 and adopted in November of 1940. The type was hampered by unreliable engines that led to only 202 examples being produced in all. The Lancaster was born from this failed design to include different engines set along a revised wing. The prototype version was nothing more than a revised Manchester complete with its triple vertical finned tail unit - the key difference lay in the selection of the Rolls-Royce Merlin X series inline piston engines of 1,145 horsepower each. Within time, the triple-finned tail unit was given up in favor of the standard twin rudder arrangement common to the Lancaster history. In its prototype form, the Lancaster went airborne for the first time on January 9th, 1941. With World War 2 in full swing and the British commitment extensive, the prototype was quickly handed to Boscombe Down for formal evaluations. Development was so speedy that a production-quality form was airborne as early as October 1941 and the series, upon passing its requisite trials, was adopted for operational service in February of 1942, quantitative orders forthcoming. Early production versions were born for Manchester airframes still on Avro lines and inducted into RAF service as the Lancaster B.Mk I. On 25 October 1939, the Halifax performed its maiden flight, and entered service with the RAF on 13 November 1940. In 1940, the first official production version of the Halifax entered service designated as the Halifax B.Mk I of which 84 total aircraft of this type were produced. The B.Mk I featured 4 x Merlin X's (or "tens") that could generate 1,280 horsepower each. Engine: 4 x Bristol Hercules 100 air-cooled radial piston engines developing 1,800 horsepower each. Maximum Speed: 271 knots (312 mph; 502 kph) Maximum Range: 1,095 nautical miles (1,260 miles; 2,028 km) Service Ceiling: 23,999 feet (7,315 meters; 4.55 miles) Internal bomb load of up to 13,000 lb (5,897 kg).
After the outbreak of the Second World War in Europe in 1939, Wallis saw a need for strategic bombing to destroy the enemy's ability to wage war and he wrote a paper entitled "A Note on a Method of Attacking the Axis Powers". Referring to the enemy's power supplies, he wrote (as Axiom 3): "If their destruction or paralysis can be accomplished they offer a means of rendering the enemy utterly incapable of continuing to prosecute the war". As a means to do this, he proposed huge bombs that could concentrate their force and destroy targets which were otherwise unlikely to be affected. Wallis's first super-large bomb design came out at some ten tonnes, far more than any current bomber could carry. Rather than drop the idea, this led him to suggest a plane that could carry it – the "Victory Bomber".

Naval Radar

Historically, in Sept 1935, the Royal Navy established their own Radar ('RDF') team at the Experimental Department of His Majesty’s Signal School (HMSS) in Portsmouth. As usual, those 'in charge' insisted on the utmost secrecy, with other scientists and engineers at Portsmouth totally excluded. After 2 years of steady work (duplicating the efforts of the RAF), this resulted in the usual fiasco with the resulting (75MHz system) proving 'unsatisfactory'.

In our alternative time-line, Churchill will take over as First Sea Lord in July 1935. He will instruct the scientists and engineers at Portsmouth to combine their efforts with the Air-force and thus avoid wasting 2 years on duplicate efforts leading to an inferior design

However as war approached some-one woke up and in August 1937 Navy Radar development was expanded to include real Engineers. The 75MHz system was reduced in frequency to 43MHz and prototypes of the 'Type 79Y air-warning system' were successfully tested at sea in early 1938. The detection range on aircraft was between 30 and 50 miles (48 and 80 km), depending on height (the RAF system achieved 100 miles, but with much larger antenna). The Navy system was first installed in August 1938 (on the cruiser HMS Sheffield) and, 2 months later in October 1938, on the battleship HMS Rodney.

Churchill will avoid the fiasco and have 43MHz Radar installed on the entire fleet by end of 1937. This will allow sufficient time before the war starts for 'familiarisation and training' to be completed. In the next two years (between end of 37 and end of 39) significant improvements will be made (by then the RAF will be fitting air-borne sets to it's night-fighters) and by 1939, Radar will be so well integrated into the British Navy's gunnery systems that almost all Navy officers will have completed a number secret night 'interception and attack' exercises.

Historically, in May 1938, the RAF starts a major effort on airborne Radar equipment. This centers on a 200-MHz (1.5 m) system, the higher frequency allowing smaller antennas suitable for aircraft installation (it also allows higher accuracy, which is vital for night interception).

In 1939, Churchill will seize on the 200MHz system and have it installed on Navy ships where it will be used together with an "anti-aircraft prediction engine" and used to control anti-aircraft guns.

Naval Air-power

Historically, the British Britain was one of the first to start experimenting with flying aircraft from ships. By the 1930's the possibilities should have been obvious to all. However, those commanding the British Navy were incapable of taking these experiments to the logical conclusion. Instead they persisted with their 'Grand Fleet' mentality and wasted the entire decade on 'bigger better battleships'. Fortunately (from the Allies) it's not just the British that ignore a Naval 'war-winning weapon' - the Germans were just as blinkered. Despite the experience of WW1, instead of focusing on their own Naval 'war winning weapon' (the U-boat) they also chose to waste the 1930's on 'bigger better battleships'. Naval air-power is closely linked with aircraft developments led by the RAF - which in turn was at the mercy of the Committees of the Air Ministry. In an alternative time-line, Churchill will be unable to change the historical path before his appointment as First Sea Lord in 3 July 1935 - however he will be able to 'take advantage' of those events 1931, 13 September - United Kingdom wins the Schneider Trophy The winning aircraft, a Supermarine S.6B (seaplane) achieved an average speed of 340.08 mph. powered by the Roll-Toyce 'R' 2350HP engine (this V12 engine is arguably the forerunner of the Merlin). On 29 September it takes the world speed record with an average speed of 655.8 km/h (407.5 mph). 1931, October - Air Ministry Specification F.7/30 Air Ministry requirements Specification F.7/30 (i.e. Fighter spec. July 1930) calls for an all-metal day and night fighter capable of at least 250 mph and armed with four machine guns. The Air Ministry "expressed a preference" for the still-in-design stage "evaporatively cooled" Rolls-Royce Goshawk engine. The Goshawk was a development of the Kestrel IV. In 1927, the Kestrel, with a pressurised cooling system, delivered 450 hp (340 kW). In an effort to improve on this, an "evaporative cooling system" was designed and the new engine designated the Goshawk. When it first ran (1933), the "Goshawk" delivered 600 horsepower (soon pushed to 660). By then, the Kestrel V was delivering 695 hp (520 kW) without any basic design changes. Evaporative cooling proved to be a 'dead end' in cooling system design - the secret to carrying away more heat is to use a fluid with a greater heat capacity - such as ethylene glycol .. At the Supermarine workshops, R. J. Mitchell uses his Schneider Trophy experience to design the Supermarine Type 224 around the 'preferred' Goshawk engine. The 224 was an open-cockpit monoplane with a large, fixed, spatted undercarriage powered by the 600 horsepower (450 kW) Goshawk. It made its first flight in February 1934, however the evaporative cooling system proved a nightmare to make work at altitude (it's limit was about 15,000 ft). The Type 224 is not accepted - in fact, of the seven designs tendered to F7/30, it is a late entrant, the Gloster Gladiator biplane (based on the Gauntlet, but with the Bristol Mercury M.E.30 radial engine, capable of generating 700 hp (520 kW)) that is accepted for service.

At this time Churchill is becoming aware of other developments in aircraft engine design (see later) - so instead of pointing out that the Gloster Gladiator is already obsolete, he is happy for Hitler to be mislead into thinking that the British have nothing better

The Type 224 was a big disappointment to Mitchell and his design team, who immediately embarked on improving the design, ending with the Type 300 (using the Rolls-Royce PV-XII V-12 engine, later named the "Merlin"). On 1 December 1934, the Air Ministry finances the construction of an improved Type 300. 1935, 3 January - Air Ministry F10/35 Air Ministry F10/35 requirement specification is written around the improved Type 300. In April 1935, the armament was changed from 4x .303 in (7.7 mm) Vickers machine guns to 8x .303 in (7.7 mm) Brownings,[12] following a recommendation by Squadron Leader Ralph Sorley of the Operational Requirements section at the Air Ministry.

In the alternative time-line, on 3 July 1935 Churchill is appointed First Sea Lord. He is soon visiting Supermarine where the F10/35 prototype is being built. Hoping to find an aircraft that can be used from Naval Aircraft Carriers in an anti-submarine role he is horrified to see it armed with .303 "peashooters". These will be totally useless against the metal 'skin' of a U-boat. After Mitchell assures him that the wing can support a 20mm cannon with minimal changes, Churchill immediately has the Naval Office issue a contract for the design of a Naval version (it will have an "arrester hook" and tail wheel rather than a tail 'skid'). In 1935, the Oerlikon 20mm cannon was available in 3 versions (the FF at 24kg, 550-600 m/s at 520 rpm, the FFL at 30kg, 675 m/s 500 rpm, and the FFS at 39 kg, 830 m/s and 470 rpm. At this time only the Germans had a comparable weapon (the MG FF). The decision is taken to go for the lighter gun (allowing more ammunition), since muzzle velocity is less significant when using explosive shells against other aircraft (the Browning .303 had a muzzle velocity of 740m/s and 1,200 rpm). Mitchell (and Supermarine) makes minor changes to the wing design so that 2 of the 4 machine guns on each wing can be 'swapped out' for a 20mm cannon 'pack'. He even works out how to vary the ammunition load (i.e. swap .303 for 20mm) To avoid the need for two production lines, the tail wheel becomes standard and the 'arrester hook' becomes a 'kit' that can be fitted (or not) as a post-production option.

1936, 5 March - Spitfire prototype (K5054) first flight This eight-minute flight[13] came four months after the maiden flight of the contemporary Hurricane. After a new propeller and new engine is fitted, it achieves a top speed of 348 mph (557 km/h). 1936, 3 June 1936, the Air Ministry orders 310 Spitfires

In out alternative time-line, on the same day, the Navy (Churchill) orders 100 Naval Spitfires, now renamed 'Seafire'

The Bomber Destroyer

During the 1930's it was 'received wisdom' that 'the Bomber will always get through'. This view is not just 'defeatist' - it is used by some as an excuse to ignore the whole issue of Air Defence and others as a reason to avoid war at all costs, even if that means 'surrender' to Hitler's every demand. It is also total nonsense - the experience of both sides during WW1 is that the fighter always 'overpowers' the bomber and that, in general, far from 'always getting through' it's more often the case that it's 'always shot down'. By the mid-30's, early radar was ensuring that detection of the bomber, even at night, was quite possible - however shooting it done was another matter. Initially, the British placed their faith in searchlights and anti-aircraft guns - however soon bombers were flying higher and out of the range of many guns. Whilst bigger guns could still reach the bombers height, it soon become obvious (to all but the "Committees") that without a leap in targeting system design (and shell design) AA-guns would never be accurate enough to score a 'hit' (except by luck).

Churchill, as First Sea Lord, is extremely concerned about the vulnerability of Navy ships to enemy bombers - especially as he is planning to use bombers against the German Navy ! However, unlike some, he is convinced that the bomber won't 'always get through' - but how to bring it down ? Plainly, at sea, the bomber does not have to 'run the gauntlet' of ground based anti-aircraft guns before reaching it's target. On the other hand, most attacks are likely to be low-level (at this time it is virtually impossible to hit a target as small as a ship from 'normal' bombing heights). However, unlike the Air Ministry at this time, Churchill avoids the temptation to focus only on Anti-Aircraft guns. So, whilst he directs that the Navy ships be fitted with more anti-aircraft guns, he also pursues the more ideal approach of using Naval Aircraft carries to launch fighters to shoot down the bombers before they get anywhere near the fleet. When it comes to fighter armament, the Air Ministry is convinced that high rates of fire are the answer - so they opt. for fighters armed with 8x small machine guns (.303's). Churchill is not so convinced. In late 1936, he sets up an 'Action Team' to perform actual tests and find out. The first tests of the 20mm cannon armed Seafire (which has been ordered for anti-submarine use) against dragged drone targets tends to support the Air Ministry. The 'closing speed' between fighter and target is so fast that an attacker is lucky to get off a as much as a '2 second burst'. The 20mm cannon (which is fine when used against a more-or-less stationary U-boat target on the surface) can't fire enough rounds to 'guarantee' a hit (at 520rpm, a '2 second burst' would deliver 17 shells per gun). However when a (single) hit is achieved with an explosive 20mm shell, the results are devastating - so Churchill directs the 'Action Team' to address the problem of improving the rate of fire of the 20mm cannon. It doesn't take long for some-one on the team to remember the Gatling gun patented in 1862. By 1876 the Gatling gun had a theoretical rate of fire of 1,200 rounds per minute (although when 'hand cranked' in combat this was nearer 400 rpm). The Action Team obtains a six barrel Model 1903 Gatling gun from a museum. In January of 1937** it is set up with an electric motor drive and (briefly) achieves 5,000 rpm (a '2 second burst' would thus deliver 166 shells). **Historically, it is in 1946 that the Model 1903 Gatling gun is test-fired with an electric motor drive by General Electric in USA. It really did achieve a rate of fire of 5,000 rounds per minute (see here) Work immediately starts on a 20mm cannon version, however it will plainly be too heavy (the estimated weight is 100kg) and too big to fit in a Seafire wing. Something else will be needed to carry an air-borne version. On the other hand, it will plainly make an excellent Anti-Aircraft guns when used against low-flying torpedo and dive bombers. Meanwhile, strenuous efforts are made to improve the rate of fire of the Oerlikon 20mm gun (Royal Navy 'operatives' having smuggled out copies of the design drawings and documents from Zürich in late 1936 (historically this happened in late 1939)). Over a period of 3 years (up to 1939) it is gradually pushed to 700rpm. As work on the 20mm rotary cannon advances during 1938, a 'retro-fit' kit is designed for installation on Navy ships (where it will supplement the existing twin and quad-barrel 6pdr (40mm) AA-gun sets). Soon a 6 barrel version capable of 6,000 rpm is developed (see M61 Vulcan, GAU-4 (gass operated) version. Note, the limit for a single barrel is about 1,000 rpm after which heating leads to jams, failures and excessive wear - however by it's nature, a rotary cannon achieves a decent amount of forced air-cooling as the barrels rotate) At the start of 1939 the rotary cannon kits are being mass-produced and the first installations start. With war now inevitable, a crash 1 year plan calls for as many as 20 sets on each 'capital' ship (Battleship, Aircraft Carrier) with proportionally fewer on smaller ships. However it is planned that even a Frigate will have 4 sets (bow, stern and one on each side, positioned so as to allow 3 sets to fire to either side against enemy torpedo planes with all 4 sets having sufficiet elevation to fire up at dive bombers). Development does not stop there - soon a 40mm version will be designed as will a 10 barrel 'dual shot' 20mm version (rotating at 5,000revs and delivering 10,000 rounds per minute, each barrel being fired after half a turn i.e. twice per revolution)

The Mosquito Historically, the De Havilland Mosquito was originally conceived as an unarmed fast bomber. When production began in 1941, it was one of the fastest operational aircraft in the world. When it entered service in autumn 1941, it was first used as an unarmed high-speed, high-altitude photo-reconnaissance aircraft. 1936, 8 September 1936 - Air Ministry Specification P.13/36 This called for a twin-engine medium bomber capable of carrying a bomb load of 3,000 pounds (1,400 kg) for 3,000 miles (4,800 km) with a maximum speed of 275 miles per hour (443 km/h) at 15,000 feet (4,600 m); a maximum bomb load of 8,000 pounds (3,600 kg) that could be carried over shorter ranges was also specified. A number of aviation firms entered heavy designs with new high-powered engines and multiple defensive turrets, leading to the production of the Avro Manchester and Handley Page Halifax. In May 1937, as a comparison to P.13/36, George Volkert, the chief designer of Handley Page, put forward the concept of a fast unarmed bomber. In 20 pages, Volkert planned an aerodynamically clean medium bomber to carry 3,000 pounds (1,400 kg) of bombs at a cruising speed of 300 miles per hour (480 km/h). There was support in the RAF and Air Ministry as it was calculated that its top speed would exceed that of the new Supermarine Spitfire. There were, however, counter-arguments that, although such a design had merit, it would not necessarily be faster than enemy fighters for long. On 7 July 1938 de Havilland writes to Air Marshal Wilfrid Freeman, the Air Council's member for Research and Development with a proposal for an all-wood aircraft based on various different engines, including the Rolls-Royce Merlin-powered DH.91. The 'final' design, In October 1938 the 'final' design is offered, it is aerodynamically clean, wooden and powered by the Merlin, faster than foreseeable enemy fighter aircraft. High speed was achieved by removing defensive armament, especially turrets, which also simplified and reduced production time. Contemporary RAF design philosophy required well-armed heavy bombers, so the Air Ministry showed little interest.

In an alternative time-line, in October 1938 Churchill pounces on the design for his cherished U-boat killer. It's small enough to fit on an Aircraft Carrier ! He immediately convinces De Havilland to start work on the Sea Mosquito It takes less than a year (to August 1939) for a prototype design (with folding wing-tips) to be flight tested. Churchill wants around 50 aircraft, however this will be too small an order to convince De Havilland to start mass production. However by this time it's obvious to all that war is inevitable. Since metal (especially aluminium) will soon be in short supply, when Churchill suggests to the RAF that they place orders for the Mosquito as a precision bomber and night-fighter he encounters little opposition. With an order for 200 from the Air Ministry and 50 from the Navy (for the Sea Mosquito variant), De Havilland starts the production lines rolling just as Hitler starts his invasion of Poland.

Historically, it was only in 1944 that specification N.15/44 is issued for a carrier-borne variant. This resulted in 50 Sea Mosquito TR Mk 33s which featured folding wings, a thimble nose radome and fuselage hard-points for mounting aerial torpedoes. These were followed by 14 Sea Mosquito TR Mk 37s, which differed in having ASV Mk. XIII radar instead of the TR.33's AN/APS-6. On 25 March 1944 the Sea Mosquito, makes it's first landing on HMS Indefatigable. It is the heaviest aircraft yet flown from a British carrier (previously, British carrier aircraft had only been single-engine and generally only about half the weight).

Development of the Jet engine (see Wikipedia)

1928 - the Whittle Jet Engine In 1928, Frank Whittle was Pilot Officer Whittle of the RAF. He showed his engine concept around the base, where it attracted the attention of Flying Officer Pat Johnson, formerly a patent examiner. Johnson, in turn, took the concept to the commanding officer of the base. After further developing the idea and encouraged by his commanding officer, in late 1929 Whittle sent his concept to the Air Ministry to see if it would be of any interest to them. With little knowledge of the topic they turned to A. A. Griffith, who had published a paper on compressors and turbines in July 1926. Griffith, perhaps jealous that some-one else was 'intruding into his field' informed them that the centrifugal design would be "too large for aircraft use" and that "using the jet directly for power would be rather inefficient" (he was wrong on both counts). The RAF turns Whittle away, referring to the design as being "impracticable", allowing Whittle to retain the rights to the idea. 1930, 16 January Pat Johnson helped Whittle patent the concept and arranged a meeting with the British Thomson-Houston (BTH) Company, whose chief turbine engineer apparently agreed with the basic idea. However, BTH did not want to spend the £60,000 it would cost to develop it, so the concept went no further at this time. The Whittle patent (granted in 1932) shows a two-stage axial compressor feeding a single-sided centrifugal compressor. Whittle would later concentrate on the simpler centrifugal compressor only, for a variety of practical reasons.

In an alternative time-line, Johnson refuses to give up and, in March 1930, approaches Rolls-Royce and convinces them to meet Whittle. This is a full 10 years before the historical meeting (which occurred in January 1940). Rolls-Royce, whose engineers were already aware of the limitations of propeller powered flight and were just about to start on a doomed effort to improve engine performance by using "evaporative cooling", leap at the chance of developing Whittle's new approach. With the backing of Rolls-Royce, the W.U. prototype Jet Engine will be running in mid 1933.

Historically, without Air Ministry support, Whittle and two retired RAF servicemen formed Power Jets Ltd to build his engine with assistance from the firm of British Thomson-Houston. Despite limited funding, a prototype was created, which first ran in 1937. At this time, Whittle was still unable to interest the Government in his invention so development continued at a very slow pace. Once war was declared, official interest was forthcoming and Whittle was given a contract to develop further engines, but the continuing stress seriously affected Whittle's health, eventually resulting in a nervous breakdown in 1940. In 1944 when Power Jets was nationalised he again suffered a nervous breakdown, and resigned from the board in 1946. In the alternative time-line, Churchill (as First Sea Lord) hears of the prototype Jet Engine in 1935. He encourages Rolls Royce to liase with Hawker aviation to build a prototype fighter around an improved version of the jet. Hawker, which has been working on the Hurrican but has een their fighter loose out to Supermarine, sieze the chance to leapfrog the Spitfire. The prototype Jet fighter has a take off runway length and a landing speed that are way above what can be accomadated by any Naval Aircraft Carrier then in design. When a 'working party' reports that a Carrier of at least twice the current size will be needed, Churchill passes the Jet initiative to the RAF. July 1936 - The Spanish Civil War starts (ends Apr 39) Historically, the Nationalist forces (Franco's fascists) are supported by Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, while the Republicans (socialist) receive support from the Communist Soviet Union and Mexico (France initially offers aid but joins UK in an official policy of non-intervention). Whilst maintaining a policy of non-intervention, Churchill manages to convince British Intelligence to use it's operatives to gather as much data as possible on the weapons being supplied by both Hitler and Stalin. Initially this proves difficult, however once the British offer to swap an equal weight of ammunition, guns or other supplies for even the remains of Nazi and Soviet equipment perts are soon being obtained. A break-through occurs when dock workers are offered British gold sovereigns (rather than paper money) and it doesn't take long before complete tanks and even aircraft are being 'diverted' to the UK. By mid 1937 the British have examples of all the major items being supplied to both sides, along with many first hand accounts of their performance. When the ME109 is examined in detail the British discover it carries 3-5 times the ammunition of the Spitfire/Hurricane and is armed with both machine guns and a 20mm cannon. The RAF decides to change their Spitfire order to the Seafire 20mm cannon version and request field modification kits for those already delivered. The British Army discover the relatively thin armour of the German Panzers and the Soviet 'T26' type tanks. They are, however, horrified when test show that the current 2pdr ammunition shatters against the Panzers 'face hardening' ! A 'quick fix' solution is the production of tungsten tipped 2pdr ammunition whilst the design of the 6pdr anti-tank gun is pushed forward with greater urgency. Although the 6pdr does go into production in early 1939, lack of urgency in producing 6pdr 'anti-tank' ammunition means that very few make it to France with the BEF (Churchill has ensured that the Navy has plenty of HE 6pdr ammunition to use with it's 6pdr aint-aircraft gun, however the Army shows little interest in this)

The war starts

September 1939 On the 1st, German forces invade Poland. In the alternative time-line, Churchill immediately orders the 'battle groups' of the Home Fleet out of Scapa Flow. The Admirals have their orders in the event of War. Radio silence is maintained - they will tune to the BBC and listen for the declaration everyone expects. Two days later, on the 3rd, Britain and France declare war. Within hours the British liner Athenia was torpedoed by U-30 off the Hebrides with the loss of 112 lives, leading the Royal Navy to assume that unrestricted U-boat warfare had begun. In the alternative time-line, Neville Chamberlain is forced to resign and Churchill becomes Prime Minister (this is a full 8 months earlier than happened historically). Both events are announced on the BBC news each hour. For some months British submarines have been 'tracking' German warships (actually, since submarines are only able to achive less than half the speed of the average warship - or 1/4 when submerged - they have been practicing the 'interception' of German Navy ships after being 'tipped off' to their course and location by Engima decrypts). When their Captains hear the declaration of war announced by the BBC, a 'lucky few' are in a position allowing them to intercept and torpedo one of these 'targets'. As the day goes on, more and more German ships run into British submarines that have been 'lying in wait' for them. History will later record that the first sinking of WW2 was not the liner Athenia but a German warship torpedoed just 15 minutes after the first BBC announcement. When the sinking of the Athenia is announced, the British submarines start going after German commercial shipping (the commercial codes are even easier to 'crack' and their almost constant demands for information on the where-abouts of British forces means that RDF (Radio Direction Finding) quickly reveals their location). [Unlike the U-boats, British submarines keep radio silence. Navy 'home base' constantly broadcasts the identity, location, speed and course of multiple 'targets' and other vital information (like, where the German scout planes are operating) - each submarine commander surfaces every few hours during the day (at some random time), when it is safe to do so (or in 'high threat' area, only at night) and records the list. They then choose a target to 'intercept' (it will often not be the 'nearest' since, in general, a submarine has to 'ambush' it's 'target' by first getting in front). Navy 'home base' listens for the distress calls of 'targets' that are 'hit' and updates their broadcast list. Submarines return to port when ordered (or when their supplies or ammunition has been used up). This makes it impossible for the Germans to 'detect' British submarines by their radio transmissions - whilst the U-boats, with their constant 'updates' back to Dönitz, not only 'gave themselves away' but allow the British to maintain a comprehensive 'count' of those sunk, those at sea, those in port, and those newly built to be maintained.] On Sept. 4th, advanced elements of the BEF depart for France In the alternative time-line, over 100 British submarines each loaded with two dozen mines have been 'loitering' outside Germany's two major shipyard ports. They surface at dusk and learn of the declaration of war. They move into position to deploy their mines. Although the mine housing on deck is streamlined, the submerged speed has been reduced to (from 17kmph) 15 kmph). Even so, some two dozens creep up the river Elbe toward Hamburg. By midnight the lead boat has travelled almost 50km up the river. The others are spaced behind him at about 2km intervals. At the stroke of midnight, the lead boat turns and slowly withdraws whilst deploying his 'bottom teathered' mines, one every 30 seconds, in the main shipping channel. After 12 mins the last mine has been dropped and he speeds up - he hsa to get past the next submarine's position before that boat also starts deploying mines at 12.20. Whilst the timing is exact (each sucessive boat starts deployment 20 mins after the last) it's a risky business - get your timing wrong and you could run into the mines being laid by your friends ! By 6am the last boat is out of the river and 'racing' for the ocean - 576 mines have been deployed and the Port is effectively closed. Just after 6am the 'river' force passes the 'approaches' force who have been waiting just outside the river mouth. At 6.30 these boats widthdraw whilst deploying their own mines. Soon over 500 mines are laid in the river mouth for good measure. The port of Kiel (on the Baltic) recieves similar treatment with over 1,000 mines laid in 3 bands across the approaches to the port. Within miniuts of his appointment as Prime Minister, Churchill issues the already signed orders for 'Operation Decap', directing a multiple precision bombing raids against German Navy ships in ports and under construction in shipyards. He has been liasing with the RAF for months. Preperation for the raids started on the 1st, so ground crews have had 48 hours to get ready. Staggered take offs during the night of 3rd Sept. (for different flight time to target) means the bombers will all 'go in' at dawn on the 4th. At dawn on the 4th RAF bombers escorted by Spitfires from UK and Seafires from Aircraft carriers attack German shipping and port facilities. Enigma decrypts has located the bulk of the Kriegsnarine. The 'primary' targets are :- At Kiel, Battleship SCHLESIEN, the 28 U-boats of Flotilla 1,3,5,7) the Heavy Cruisers ADMIRAL HIPPER (historically refitting until mid-Jan 40), BLÜCHER (under construction, historically completed 20 Sep 1939), PRINZ EUGEN (under construction, historically completed 1 Aug 1940) + at least 20 U-boats underconstruction and 3 in for repair/refit(refitting). Kiel also contains the major U-boat construction yards. At Hamburg, Battleship BISMARCK under construction (historically completed 24 Aug 1940), Destroyers and MTB' At Wilhelmshaven, the Pocket battleship ADMIRAL SCHEER + 17 U-boats (Flotilla 2 and 6) plus 2 or 3 U-boats refitting At Brunsbüttel, Battlecruisers GNEISENAU and SCHARNHORST At Neustad, U-Boat Training Flotilla (12 U-boats) At Cuxhaven, minesweepers At Danzig, Battleship - SCHLESWIG HOLSTEIN At Flensburg, torpedo training At Pillau, destroyers At Swinemünde, destroyers At Bremen, 8 U-boats under construction Before dawn of the 4th, the Aircraft Carriers of the Home Fleet will have reached positions from which they can launch fighters to support of the bombers 'over target'. There are 14 U-boats at sea in the Baltic. The exact position of each has been known for days (they radio home every few hours). Two 'U-boat killer' aircraft from the new Royal Navy Fleet Aircraft Carriers have been assigned to deal with each one - these U-boats are not designed for long periods submerged - they typically spend the night on the surface and only submerge during the day in 'high threat' areas. A pair of aircraft is assigned to each 'target'. One uses it's radar at height to direct the other at low level onto the target. At dawn on the 4th of Sept. the last sight of many of their Captain's will be a 20mm rotary cannon armed Mosquito coming at them out of the rising sun. Some survive a few seconds longer to see the second Mosquito coming at them from a higher altitude. The Battleship 'task forces' have all arrived 'on station' before midnight of the 3rd Sept. They anchor some 10-20km off shore and use their radars in 'pulse mode' to confirm the exact distances to their targets. On the stroke of midnight, they turn on their radar jamming transmitters and start to bombard the ships docked in every German port 'accessible' from the North Sea. [The horizon, in km, seen from a height of H meters is 3.75 times the root of H. For the average man standing at ground level H=1.7m and the horizon is 4.7km. The gun flashes of ships 10-20km away will not be visible to those in the port.] It is expected that the combination of jamming and explosions will be misstaken for an air-raid and is designed to 'bring up' whatever night fighters the Luftwaffe have protecting the port. More to the point, the German coastal batteries will see nothing to fire at. Churchill's hope is that the night fighters, on spotting the gun flashes, will try to 'engange' the ships at low level. Every ship is equipped with searchlghts and mutiple short range AA guns. No doubt hits will be scored on both sides - however the nightfighter 20mm cannon shells will be largly ineffective against even light ship armour. Before dawn the nightfighters will be out of fuel and back at their bases, where the Luffwaffe will, no doubt, be preparing their bombers for a dawn attack on the ships. When senor officers in Whitehall complain about the 'risk' of Luftwaffe bomber attack on their precious Battleships, Churchill replies 'If our ships hit their targets this day they will have done their duty. If not, then I would rather they be sunk now than spend the rest of the war as useless trophies skulking in our ports'. As dawn approaches, the first Seafires arrive escorting 'U-boat killers' in a ground attack role over the German airfields. At the same tinme, RAF bomber forces pass over the ships heading towards the ports. The 'task forces' cease fire (to avoid hitting the RAF low-level bombers), however when the bombers turn for home, the escorting fighters 'divert' over the Luffwaffe airfields to shoot up anything left over by the 'U-boat killers'. As the bombers depart, aircraft from the Carriers arrive to act as 'spotters' for the fall of shells as the bombardment resumes. For the next few hours, a contineous streams of fighters and 'U-boat killers' cycle from the Aircraft Carriers to targets in and around the ports and Luffwaffe bases. The task forces only start to withdraw around midday, after hours of continuous bombardment, when the Battleships have almost run out of ammunition. At Hamburg (which is reached via the Elbe, some 50km from the sea), and Kiel (on the Baltic, a 'trap' for any Naval force) there is no bombardment. Instead each recieves the attentions of the new 4 engined heavy bombers each carrying the brand new 'Tallboy' bomb. When dropped from 5,000 feet accuracy is more or less 'guaranteed'. At Hamburg, the target is the construction facilities and especially the Battleship BISMARCK (under construction and historically completed on 24 Aug 1940). One squadron (12 aircraft) is detailed to the attack. At Kiel, the target is the Battleship SCHLESIEN, the 28 U-boats of Flotilla 1,3,5 & 7 and 20+ U-boats under construction. Also under construction are the Heavy cruisers ADMIRAL HIPPER (historically refitting until mid-Jan 40), BLÜCHER (historically completed 20 Sep 1939) and PRINZ EUGEN (historically completed 1 Aug 1940). At this time Britian has only 8 operational squadrons of heavy bombers, however only some 75 Tallboy bombs are ready in time. 12 are sent to Hamberg, leaving 63 for Kiel. Of the 7 squadrons (84 aircraft) assigned to Kiel, 5 carry Tallboys, one squadron has 3 Tallboys (and 9 aircraft carrying 1,000 bombs) and the remaining carries 1,000 bombs. One Tallboy squadron (12 aircraft) targets each of the 4 ships using a total of 48 Tallboys. The rest (15 Tallbiys, 17 aircfat 1,000 bombs) target the U-boats and U-boat construction yards. The entire operation is a complete surprise. Results (as is usual in war) are mixed :- At Hamburg 4 bombs hit the Bismark which is almost totally destroyed. The near misses wreak the shipyard (5 bombs hit water/mud/soft ground and fall to detonate on impact, however each explodes later when the time-fuse expires). At Kiel debris and smoke thrown up from the first bombs to drop make it hard for the follow-up bombers to distinguish their targets. As a result, SCHLESIEN is targetted by 14 bombs (4 direct hits), BLÜCHER by 8 bombs (2 hits), ADMIRAL HIPPER by 18 (5 hits) and PRINZ EUGEN by only 6 (1 hit). The near misses cause significant additional damage and wreak slipways and other parts of the shipyards. SCHLESIEN and ADMIRAL HIPPER are 'write-offs'. BLÜCHER and PRINZ EUGEN are repariable - however the shipyards will have to be repaired first. Although smaller targets, the U-boats are moored close together. A Tallboy dropping in their midst will destroy one boat and damage those to either side. However the construction yards are the 'priority' target. The squadron with 3 Tallboys and 1,000 bombs aimed at docked U-boats destroy 12 and damage 5 others. The final two squadrons with 12 Tallboys aimed at the construction yards achieve 4 direct hits on partially built U-boats, however they wreak the yards. Near misses together with hits from 1,000 bombs destroy 5 and damage 12 other U-boats under construction. The Kriegsmarine has been virtually wiped out and the U-boat force has been cut in half - whilst many damaged boats will be repairable, damage to the dockyard facilities will have to be repaired first. Over the next year, the Royal Navy will track down and eliminate the German ships that where at sea during this attack. By the 27 September the full BEF is in France (152,000 soldiers + 21,424 army vehicles) At the beginning of the war, Germany possessed 60 U-boats, but was building new vessels quickly and would have over 140 by the summer of 1940. In the alternative time-line, Operation Decap damages over 30 U-boats beyond repair (and a further 10 are sunk in the Baltic). Damage to U-boats under construction and the construction facilities at Kiel will delay the build-up of U-boats. By the Summer of 1940, Germany will have less than 90 boats. In an alternative time-line, Churchill puts into immediate effect his 'conmbined arms command' policy. The three individual Army, Navy and Air-Force 'central commands' in Whitehall are disbanded and replaced with a single 'Combined Forces' central command, located in a single building and consisting only the few most flexible and forward thinking of the previous commanders (along with many of their newly prompted previous subordinates), the rest being retired with immediate effect. Officer 'ranks' across the 3 services are 'equalised', allowing officers of any service to command the lower ranks of any other service as needed. Senior officers of all 3 services are reminded that the enemy is across the channel, not across the road (or in the next office) and that their willing co-operation is now an absolute requirement to defeat the Germans. Even so, numerous attempts by individual Army/Naval/Air Force senior officers to 'favour' their 'own' command by "cornering" resources against the needs of a 'different' Service have to be dealt with by summary court-martial (although compulsory retirement is the usual sentence rather than the firing squad). Further, captured German equipment is immediately studied by experts and 'lessons learnt'. This quickly identifies their use of face-hardened armour and the frequencies used by their fighter and bomber forces (both for communication and 'beam riding' (navigation)). Countermeasures are devised - such as tungsten tipped anti-tank rounds. The resources put into radio and radar jamming speeds the development of all sorts of electronic systems. Research in the 1930's had already revealed the inadequacies of the .303 (7.6mm) machine gun (it taking 5 hits to do any significant damage), however the 'requirements committees' had rejected the US .5" (12.7mm) (whihc needed 2 to 3 hits) and chose the (then new) French Hispano-Suiza HS.404 (whihc did significant damage with a single hit. However this cannon was incapable of reliable operation when fitted within a flexible wing, so the Spitfires and Hurricains entered service with 8x .303 'pea shooters' instead. The same mentality = whihc can be summed up as "better no solution than half a solution" had also rejected self-sealing petrol tanks (as "not crash proof"). Lessons learnt over Dunkirk, when the puny .303 machine guns proved almost totally ineffective against German bombers, lead to the immediate mounting of the 20mm cannon in a 'blister' below the engine of Hurricanes. This was 'just in time' for the Battle of Britain (10 July-end Oct 1940). This drastically improves their performance as a bomber destroyer (and allows them to sweep the Stuka dive-bombers from the sky). Other lessons are also learnt - such as one hit anywhere on a Spitfire wing was enough send it down in flames - leads to the immediate fitting of self-sealing fuel tanks on fighters (and then all other aircraft), as well as other improvements in survivability (armoured glass, armoured pilot seat) and the fitting of the carburetter 'negative G, anti-flood' valve. Meanwhile, massive efforts are put into addressing the 20mm cannon wing-mount reliability problems, with the result that when the Spitfire 'b' wing (with 2x 20mm cannon replacing 4 of the useless .303's) enters servive mid Oct 1940 (historically Nov 1940) it proves 100% reliable from 'day 1', just in time to put the final seal on the Battle of Britian (which ends on 30 Oct 1940). By Nov 1940, as the Me109's trying to protect the bombers finally accept that their losses when fighting cannon armed Spitfires are unsustainable, the Germans move over to night attacks. This is the start of the 'Blitz'. However, in anticipation of this, the Mosquito (which historically only first flew in Nov 1940) night-fighter version has been given priority and, armed with 4x 20mm cannon, over 2 dozen are available to take on the bombers immediately (historically it entered service in late 41). The Mosquito soon replaces the Hurricane, and by April 1941 the Hurricane production lines have switched over to building Mosquito's (which go straight from the factories into combat). The Mosquito is soon flying both night and day (with two crews). Wiping out the Luftwaffe bombers with impressive efficiency at night, and by day are attacking German reconnaissance aircraft and U-boats (which move on the surface to and from the French atlantic ports). Although not maneuverable enough to dog-fight against Me109's, the Mosquito can out-run the Me109 (and lead them directly toward the waiting Spitfires). One of the first actions taken by Churchill is to disband the "Directorate of Tanks and Transport" committee and have their members conscripted into the Army (these are the time-wasters who only wake up to the need for a 6pdr armed tank in mid-1940, then hold a meeting in January 1941 and decide that the 6pdr tank needed to be in production by early 1942 - and were then responsible for the Cromwell / Cavalier / Centaur fiasco and subsequent confusion. Their planned new "Infantry Tank" (Churchill) is cancelled whilst still on the drawing board. Even before Dunkirk it is recognised that the Matilda 2pdr gun is ineffective against most Panzers and useless against Infantry (because it lacked HE ammunition). After Dunkirk, those responsible for deciding that not to produce and issue the HE ammunition are identified and conscripted. Luckily, the 6pdr gun design has just been 'finalised' (by a Woolwich Arsenal 'committees', who took over 2 years, from 1938-1940) so can be put into immediate production (with both anti-tank and HE ammunition from 'day 1'), although there is some delay with the anti-tank version for the Army when it is discovered that the (Navy focused) 'committee' has failed to design a carriage for it ! Again, those responsible are quickly identified, their committees disbanded and the members conscripted. A carriage is quickly designed and, with an eye on the future, it is made just small enough to fit inside the Horsa glider (rather than just wide enough not to fit). After Dunkirk, the existing 2pdr (40mm) 'anti-tank' guns are given to the Home Guard, whilst the gun itself continues to be built as a dual and quad mount AA gun (and which becomes the standard light AA for use against dive bombers (both land and sea) and torpedo bombers (sea). When fitted to the Sunderland flying boat (and then the Mosquito) it is even used against U-boats (and, by the Mosquito, against enemy tanks). The need for a 'tank destroyer' is recognised (a 6pdr moubnted in a fast, lightly armoured chassis instead of a rotating turret) so a suitable chassis has to be found. Development of the 17pdr is pushed forward and hollow-charge (anti-tank) ammunition developed for the 25pdr. An urgent evaluation of all 'current' British tanks was undertaken prior to May 1940 in order to plan their future. The decision has already been taken to 'up-gun' existing tanks (where possible) since this will be faster than starting with a new design. With an eye on the future, existing tanks are also evaluated for their 'upgradability' (bigger engines, more armour, bigger guns). It is immediatly realised that the Matilda has no future = it can't be 'up-gunned' and is too small and heavy to be used as the basis of a Self-propelled gun chassis. So, in May 1940, HE ammunition is issued for it's 2pdr gun and many are shipped overseas (North Africa, Create, Singapore etc) where it will is expected to face Italian (and Japanese) tanks and where it's heavy armour will make it virtually invulnerable. It is also used as mobile mount for a dual 2pdr (40mm) AA gun (with rader direction) against the Stuka and other low-flying (ground attack) aircraft. The Covenanter (Cruiser) tank, which is 'good in theory' (it has a Christie (T34 style) suspension and well sloped armour, especially the turret) had been rushed into production in 1938 (even before the prototype had been completed). However it is immediately obvious that it is much too unreliable (it suffered from massive engine cooling problems). Historically it entered service as a Home Guard / training vehicle, but never left UK or saw active service before being canned in 1943 (after a wasteful 1,771 had been built). In Steve's reality, in May 1940 the Covenanter production line is immediately switched to producing the Crusader instead (see below), although not before the Factory owners had to be threatened with conscription and a number of 'patent lawyers' actually conscripted. The Crusader (Cruiser) tank is very similar to the Covenanter, however without the reliability issues. Initial production models only have 40mm armour and a 2pdr gun, however it can take a bigger turret, so a (sloped armour) 6pdr retro-fittable turret is immediately designed and rushed into production. The basic design is up-armoured to 60mm and a more powerful engine is fitted (to up it's cross-country speed from 15 to 20mph and from 26 to 30 mph road). Even before the 6pdt turret replaces the 2pdr on the main production line, the chassis is being used as the basis for a 'tank destroyer' (initially with 6pdr gun). Next to be evaluated is the Valentine (Infantry tank), which (in May 1040) has just started production with a 'box' style 2pdr turret. It has 'reasonable' 65mm front armour and a good sized turret ring (which means it can take much larger guns). During the 8 months 'Phony War', Churchill's secret 'tank design' working group (made up of actual deigners and tank commanders) design a sloped armour cast/welded 6pdr turret, that can be retro-fitted into existing tanks and even manage to get a few prototypes built in sympthetic factories away from the eyes of the 'equipment committees'. In may 1940 orders are immediatly placed for these turrets and, following a massive production effort, sufficient 6pdr turrets are shipped to North Africa in time to retro-fit the Valantines, which (together with 2pdr HE ammunition Matildas and 25pdrs armed with hollow-charge AT rounds) are soon facing the Panzers III's () of the Afrika Korps (which was dispatched to North Africa in February 1941). A 'working party' of factory engineers and tank crew is formed and is soon focussed on improving the basic Valentine design. As a result, it is quickly improved with many changes made for increased reliability plus ease of manufacturing and servicing. Many recomendations are also made for 'future enhancements'. One of the first steps is to fit a more powerful engine and increase the thickness of the front armout from 65 (part rivitted) to 80mm (cast/welded) with a proper sloped front faceia (giving an effective armour approx 110mm). The side and rear armour is also increased in thickness. Even with heavier armour, the new engine improves it's cross-country speed to just over 20mph (25mph road). These tanks soon become the 'standard' British AFV, especially after it is (retro)fitted with the 17pdr prior to D-Day (at this time the Sherman had 50mm of front armour at 45 degrees (effective 70mm) and a 30% less effective 75mm gun (actually, the M61 APCBC shell was only 5% less effective than the 17pdr, however General Lesley McNair ordered that this shell was not to be used becasue (in his opinion) tanks should not be used against other tanks). The Germans were not of the same opinion and, after large numbers of Shermans have been wiped out by German Panzers (and after McNair has an 'accident') this policy is reversed. Those few warships still under construction are drastically modified - Battleships and Cruisers are converted into Aircraft Carriers and more started. A 'crash program' is implemented to drastically improve the anti-aircraft armament of all existing British warships. Multiple radar aimed (and later, radar controlled) dual and quad mont 2pdr (37mm) guns are fitted to all Navy ships. When coming under air-attack, ships Captains are taught to maneuver toward the attacker and present the smallest possible target (the 'side on' approach, adopted by some and intended to 'bring their guns to bare' is suicide against torpedo planes). Needless to say, AA guns mounted on the sides on ships all have sufficient 'field of fire' to aim forwards (and those on the stern immediatly aim straight up so as to engage the enemy aircraft as it overflies the ship). A massive building program of anti-submarine 'escort' ships and aircraft carriers is immediately started. Anti-submarine technology gets priority, leading to the early development and deployment of both the 'acoustic homing torpedo' (tuned to U-boat diesel engine noise and able to be ship launched or air dropped against U-boats on the surface) and 'sonar-homing torpedo' (able to home in on a 'target' U-boat 'illuminated' by a sonar signal and launched by the sonar using ship against submerged U-boats). A 'self homing' (air-launched) torpedo (with an active sonar 'head') soon follows. Both types are quickly adapted for use in the 'mine belt' of under-sea devices that are spread over the continental-shelf in front of the French Atlantic ports being used by the U-boats (sensitive hydro-phones are used to detect U-boat electric engine noise and activate the self-homing sonar torpedo). The focus on technology, and especially on Radar and radio systems, means that electronic systems of all types are developed and massively improved. This leads to all sorts of guidance systems - such as the radar homing 'Tallboy' (a 10 ton bomb), allowing pin-point night bombing of 'highly radio reflective' targets with the aid of the H2S ground radar (and, in some cases, Resistance fighters distributing packets of 'window' (radar reflective foil strips) on factory roofs and on the ground above targets such as railway tunnels). It also means Bletchley Park gets an electronic version of the Polish electro-mechanical 'Bombe' (which soon proves capable of cracking Enigma keys in minutes rather than hours). Instead of the programmable 'Colossus' computer being ready 'just in time' for D-Day (1944), a version aimed at Enigma is 'up and running' in 1942 and cracking keys in seconds - and even proves capable of 'cracking' the 4 rotor Enigma immediately it is introduced. Bomber command never starts indiscriminate area bombing - instead of "1,000 bomber raids", dozens of missions against multiple specific targets are flown each night, each by a dozen or so aircraft. They use both the Wallis 'bouncing bomb' (against dams, shipping, dock facilities, U-boat pens and other suitable 'low level' targets - including ground targets (the 'bouncing bomb' bounces just as well on (flat) land)) and the radar guided 10-ton Tallboy bombs (against bridges, docks, dams, railway marshalling yards and tunnels, locks, oil refinaries and storage, mines, iron and steel works, and even 'critical component' factories (chemicals, fighter engines, ball-bearings etc). A smaller version of the 'bouncing bomb' is used by the Mosquito in high speed precision daylight raids. Initially used to target airfield buildings (hangers, workshops etc) the Mosquito pilots are soon bouncing their bombs into railway tunnel and U-boat pen entrances. Newspapers print Bomber Commands boasts of "500 targets destroyed in 24 hours (German military production crippled)" rather than "1,000 bomber raids (thousands of civilians killed)". Masked by the use of 'chaff' and radar jamming aircraft (the use of Radar homing bombs means that no German Radar station ever stays 'on-air' for long anyway), and protected by dozens of night-fighters, Bomber Commands losses are minimal. Instead of loosing hundreds of bombers every week, only a few dozen are lost each month. With no need to build thousands of replacement bombers, the resources saved are used to build hundreds of jet fighters and ground attack aircraft instead. The 'radio homing' Tallboy will prove to be a 'war winning' weapon. Hundreds are deployed on their first night of use, all against the German coastal Radar Stations, 90% of which are simply wiped out. Next, with Mosquito escorts, it's the turn of inland Radar Stations and German night-fighter control radio beacons and transmitters. Over the following few months Bomber Command hits targets almost anywhere in Europe at will, almost without warning or effective opposition. Meanwhile, the Mosquitos hunt down the German night-fighters who, without ground based radar to guide them, are forced to turn on and use their own radar (thus giving themselves away). Although the Germans soon counter by deploying multiple 'sacrificial' radar aerials per Radar Sation, the British respond with a 'radar homing kit' that can be fitted to a standard 1,000lb bomb and then one small enough for the 500lb bomb .. soon switching from one aerial to another just means dozens of bombs 'target' dozens of aerials (of course British bombs are cheaper, and faster to build, than German radar aerials). The use of H2S radar means ground 'targets' can be 'illuminated' for the homing bomb. Soon after the German Radar is taken down, every German Naval surface ship 'in dock' comes under attack, with the bigger ships being sunk first (the bigger the metal ship, the bigger the radar reflection and thus the easier it is to hit the target). Even though the German Navy manages to get some of it's ships out to sea, they are not safe there either - improvements in the 'homing' system soon make it possible to hit a moving target (although this is never as reliable as aiming at stationary ones). Needless to say, shipyards don't last long when subjected to a rain of 10 ton bombs, so building new 'capital ships' is soon impossible. The Gewmans counter by building smaller ships and U-boats 'in sections' inland, the parts of which are then assembled in underground buildings next to the coast. Of course the French Resistance are soon spredaing 'window' foil strips all over the gound above ... Radar homing bombs finally end the U-boat 'wolf pack' tactics. U-boats would be deployed across the expected convoy route. When a convoy is found by one U-boat, it would call in others (the 'wolf pack'). However, a U-boat underwater is hard pressed to keep up with the speed of the average merchant ship. So whilst the first can stay hidden underwater, the others must travel on the surface to 'get ahead' of a convoy so they can lie in wait for the cover of darkness. Before the deployment of Radar on escort vessels, they would often also attack (at night) on the surface, their low profile making them very hard to detect. Radar soon put a stop to that trick and Allied air cover (and escort carriers) soon made it risky to travel on the surface during the day - however they could still 'get ahead' by travelling on the surface during the night = and then attack whilst submerged. Using 'wolf pack' tactics, a dozen or more U-boats attacking at the same time could overwhelm half-dozen escort vessels (especially as these would be the first targets to be torpedoed). Of course Enigma (and RDF) would reveal where the U-boats were when ordered to 'get ahead' of the convoy, so the British would usually order the convoy to change course in an attempt to avoid the gathering 'wolf pack'. The escort carriers could also send their aircraft to 'back track' the route that individual U-boats would have to take. A U-boat detected on the surface during the day could then be attacked visually - however at night they were almost impossible to spot visually although they would still be 'seen' by radar. Vulnerable to sonar homing torpedoes when submerged, when British Radar was detected 'all' the U-boat had to do at night - when travelling or surfaced to recharge their batteries - was to stop it's engines and stay on the surface. With no diesel noise and sonar ineffective against surface targets, the U-boat would be almost 'immune'. Although larger Allied aircraft (including the Mosquito night-fighter) carried a search-light that could be used to illuminate the U-boat (which then allows an attack with machine-gun and cannon fire), the escort carrier fighters were too small to carry such aids. However the radar homing bomb now puts an end to this tactic, as it can always hit a nice big metal stationary target on the surface. Whilst U-boats can still avoid radar detection by remaining submerged, travel on the surface by day or night (to get ahead of the convoy) has become extremely risky. Any U-boat detected on the surface now has no option but to surrender or dive and take it's chances against the active sonar homing torpedo (if it can dive fast enough (a fully trained U-boat crew could 'crash dive' in 30 seconds) it stands a 'reasonable' chance at night as the attacker has to guess when/where to drop the torpeado) Individual U-boats 'lucky enough' to be in the convoy's path can still attack, however they can no longer 'call in' the 'wolf pack' - and half-a-dozen escort ships armed with sonar homing torpedoes will soon 'take out' a single U-boat.

This note last modified: 8th Jul 2020 03:45.
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Lucky for Europe, Hitler was a megalomaniac. He just couldn't resist getting his 'military action' in first, even when letting the Poles / Russians strike first would have changed events to his advantage.

Hitler never wanted war against Britain/France - his 'target' all along was Russia. If the Nazis can avoid war in Europe until after December 7, 1941, both Britain and France will become involved with USA against Japan - after which a Nazi attack on Russia can be conducted without fear of interference from the west. For more of how Hitler could have won Europe, see below :-

(+) The Nazi alternative - (How Hitler defeats the Soviets and dominates Europe)

Next I look at how Britain could end up dominating Europe. There is no military solution I can see = even an alliance with Germany against Russia (and France) leaves the Germans, not the British, 'in charge'.

The two things that prevent British domination are the Nazi's and the Communists - and both of these are a direct result of WW 1. Further, prior to WW1, the British Empire spanned the globe. Two World Wars later and the Empire was all but gone. So we have to find a way avoid WW1 - and that's not easy.

Without doubt, WW1 was the result of allowing politicians to direct 'foreign policy'. Instead of working to improve the wealth of their citizens, the politicians of every European country focused on territorial expansion and 'power grabs' at the expense of their own and the citizens of other countries. Britain, in particular, squandered the advantages of being the first country to industrialise by wasting it's wealth on ever more and ever bigger Battleships, most of which go to the scrap yards without ever firing a shot in anger.

Instead of confrontation, we need co-operation = and the ingredients are there for this to happen. Many of the Royal Families of Europe are the direct descendants of Queen Victoria. If, after Queen Victoria, the Royals of Europe take the lead in foreign policy, co-operation is more or less guaranteed. With Britain leading the industrialisation of nations, it's not too much of a stretch to envisage the formation of the 'United Kingdoms of Greater Europe' (including Russia, but excluding France, and led by Britain, of course) in the early 1900's.

The key is to avoid military conflict = Communism was just a crack-pot theory promoted by a few 'ivory tower' intellectuals = it would never have taken root if it wasn't for the food shortages and famine caused by WW1.

It's entirely possible that Japan would be deterred from attacking USA by the existence of the United Kingdoms of Europe (who, of course, would be quick to sign trade and defense treaties with USA). However without US interference Japan would eventually win their war against China and Korea.

Japan then gets to play the role of Hitler as they demand 'independence' for Malaysia, Vietnam and the other Asian territories from the 'oppression of the Europeans'. No doubt they will have the sympathy of American citizens, which will help them achieve their aims (the 'Greater Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere'). However, just like Hitler, at some point they will go too far - the invasion of India perhaps ? - and war will come to the world after all ... except this time the USA will not be directly involved. As a result, it will the (German) scientists of Europe that build the Atomic Bomb. For more on this, see :-

(+) The British alternative - (How the United Kingdom of Europe is formed)

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1) Ardennes, 1940

The French are sitting in the Maginot Line, the BEF is advancing through Belgium and the Germans are coming through the Ardennes. You are caught unawares, your tanks are slow and dispersed. The Germans are fast and determined to cut you off - can you stop their Blitzkrieg before it reaches the channel ?

You play the Allies. Europe is lost if the Axis reach the channel, else you win. The computer can play the allied side, however the Allied side really doesn't stand much chance

In this game, the AI won't halt the German tanks before Dunkirk, so I've not bothered to provide the Allies with any boats to evacuate the BEF

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2) Battle of Brody (aka Dubna), 23-30 June 1941

Notable for the employment of the Soviet KV (approx 140 present) and T34 (approx 171), this was one of the most intense armoured engagements in the opening phase of Operation Barbarossa and probably the biggest tank battle in history.

Responding to this chaotic Soviet counteroffensive, 750-800 German tanks defeated between 2,500 and 3,500 Soviets = see Wikipeadia. German losses were approx 200 tanks, Soviets approx 800.

When it comes to losses, it's to be noted that even at this stage of the war the Germans had superb 'recovery and repair' services, even capable of operating 'under fire'. Further their tank crews had sufficient mechanical education and training to repair many faults (such as track damage) on their own. The Soviets crews had essentially no mechanical training and they had essentially no battlefield repair teams. They may have had the ability to repair tanks after a battle, however any immobile Soviet tank left on the battlefield for any reason ended up in German hands so was a total loss. The Germans had total air-supremacy, so I've given no fighters to either side (the Soviets didn't have any, the Germans didn't' need any). The Stukas thus operate with impunity (the Luftwaffe claimed some 200 Soviet tanks destroyed, but more significant was their ability to separate the Soviet tanks from their supporting infantry and deny them resupply of fuel and ammunition). Best played as the Germans, since only the AI would be stupid enough to behave as the Soviets did on the day :-)
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3) The Dieppe Raid, 19 August 1942

Ineptly planned by some "Royal" relative (who took over when the original planners (correctly) predicted disaster), characterised by lack of co-ordination (or, to be more exact, lack of co-operation) between the Army, Navy and Air Force, with 'political considerations' and 'hidden objectives' that none of Canadians (who were used as diversionary 'cannon fodder') knew, this was doomed to failure from the start

Interestingly, tanks were landed on the beaches at Dieppe, which should have told the Germans something (they were apparently quite surprised when the 'DD' Shermans swam ashore on D Day). However even this was messed up by using the heavily armoured (operative word here is HEAVY) slow and poorly armed (6pdr pop-gun) 'Churchill' tank. It turned out that a combination of heavy tank, narrow tracks and a shingle beach made for 'sitting ducks' as half of them got stuck on the beaches. Still it could have been worse = we might have used the even more heavily armoured, narrow tracked and poorly armed Matilda !

Best played as the allied side, your objective is the 4 rotor Enigma machine and code books in the German HQ in the township itself. You win if your 'special forces' take the building, but you really don't stand much chance (although you don't have to sail your 'special forces' up the river into the teeth of the German port defenses, as the Allies did on the day)

The Germans win by wiping out the allied 'special forces', or if the Allies fail to take the HQ within X turns

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4) Kursk (and the Battle of Prokhorovka on the 12th), July 1943

Operation Citadel (Kursk and the battle of Prokhorovka) is significant for the introduction of the German Tiger 1 (heavy tank), Panther (medium tank) and the mass employment of the Soviet T34 (medium tank). Both sides had numerous other tanks - the Germans were still using the Panzer 4 (medium) and Panzer 3 (light tank, mostly in the infantry support role, eg as a flame thrower) and the Soviets had the KV-1 (a slow medium tank) as well as the T-60 and T-70 (light tanks). Both sides had self-propelled anti-tank guns - especially the Germans (who had the 'Elephant' (heavy) to complement the StuG's, for a total of more than 1/4 of their armoured strength), whilst the Soviets had the SU-76 & 122 (but in much fewer numbers, about 5% of their armoured forces).

Despite the many delays, the Germans started with far fewer tanks and other resources that they really needed if they were ti stand much chance of success. In fact, the Soviets started with approx 4679 tanks + 259 SP guns, the Germans approx 2078 tanks + 850 SP guns, so the Germans were outnumbered about 2:1. Worst, from the German point of view, the Soviets knew they were coming and had had plenty of time to fortify the Kursk salient and lay extensive minefields. Finally (for once) Stalin managed to resist the temptation of pre-emptive strike (the only result of which, up to that date, had been the loss of the entire attacking force), waiting until the Germans had bled themselves dry against the defences before launching their usual frontal attack (with no consideration for casualties) which this time succeeded against the weak German allied forces that had been stripped of armour for the Kursk offensive

The CF A.I. must, of course, play the part of the Soviets, where the A.I's 'charge the enemy (and get killed)' perfectly mirrors the Soviet tank 'tactics' of the time. The human player has to play the German side (especially as the 'repair' of 'damaged' tanks before they are totally wiped out is going to be the key to any chance of 'winning')

Normally, the AI has no 'concept' of defense = i.e. it will always move it's infantry out of the trenches/pill boxes etc. and charge the enemy tanks. The only way to stop this (short of giving their Infantry a '0' movement allowance) is to line the front of the Soviet trenches with mines. Since units can't move through any other unit (and the AI can't attack it's own mines) this will stop the AI moving it's Infantry forward before the enemy has blown a hole in the minefield. The occasional unit that the AI has wandering off to the rear (in an effort to find another way to reach the enemy) also matches the 'reliability' of the Soviet forces. The AI's 'reinforcements' are generated by using the Events system to load 'crystals' into (unmarked) 'factory' hex's on the road access points of the AI base line. To prevent the AI building the 'wrong' unit, each factory can produce only one type. Te German player gets 'mobile repair workshops' (these can only 'repair' tanks, not infantry :-) ). To simulate the German resource problems, the Repair Workshops come with only a few 'crystals' - to 'replenish' these a 'carrier' has to make the journey from the German base line rail head 'depot' .. For the purpose of the game, the Germans 'win' by capturing and holding all the villages as well as Kursk itself. The Soviets win by wiping out the Germans

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The Battlefield

The Kursk salient was 250 kilometres (160 mi) long from north to south and 160 kilometres (99 mi) from east to west. The Tiger 1 could knock out the T34 at a range of about 3-4km (and the Elephant / 88mm field gun at a range in excess of 6km). Since we want to reflect this in the 'units' ability, we give the Tiger a range of 1-2 hex's (and the 88/Elephant 1-3), making 1 hex = 2km. This gives us a battle field 125 (wide) x 80 (high) hex's in size (for a total of 10,000 hexes) = which is (just) playable.

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5) Market Garden ('a bridge too far') - 17 Sept. 1944

A very good Documentary can be found on yourtube

You play the Allies (the AI can't cope with multiple 'objectives'). Whilst the focus is on the airborne forces (Market), especially at Arnhem, success depends on getting XXX (30) Corps (Garden) across the Waal at Nijmegen and then across the Arnhem bridge. So you play all 3 elements of the Allied forces - the 3 British and one Polish Brigades at Arnhem, the US 82nd Division (3 brigades) at Grave / Nijmegen and (from day 2) XXX Corps arriving South of Nijmegen.

You win by taking (both sides of) the Rhine Bridge at Arnhem and "holding until relieved". You loose if you don't hold the Bridge and haven't been relieved by the end of day 9.

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6) Battle of the Bulge (16 December 1944 – 25 January 1945)

Just when you think the Nazis are beat and you are sitting down with your feet up and looking forward to a nice Xmas meal, it's Blitzkrieg time again

As the Allies, you have to stop the Axis reaching Antwerp.

Again, the computer can play the Allied side, but really has no idea of how to defend - although (to some extent) this is mitigated by giving the computer extra units

The pages in this topic are :-

+ WW2 Brody Dubno

+ WW2 Dieppe - (Issue 1)

+ WW2 2nd El Alamein == Latest changes (modified 8th Jul 2020 03:35.)

+ CF El Alamein map

+ WW2 Kursk

+ WW2 Market Garden - (overview)

+ WW2 Arnhem

+ WW2 Nijmegen Arnhem

Next page :- WW2 Brody Dubno
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To download from this site, Right Click the link and choose 'Save Link As'

The Maps

I retain Copyright to my own Maps, Units and Terrain (artwork and definitions) files, however I grant you the standard open Source Licence for personal use

Alternate history "scenarios"

(+) The Constraints of History

(-) Less of a near run thing - (How UK wins the war and saves lives)

British "alternative history" of WW2

How lessons from the past guide Churchill's war preparations

The Day One strike plan

The Circus

The "Battleship Bomb"

Blocade

Convoy protection

Naval Radar

Naval Air-power

The Bomber Destroyer

Development of the Jet engine (see Wikipedia)

The war starts

(+) The Nazi alternative - (How Hitler defeats the Soviets and dominates Europe)

(+) The British alternative - (How the United Kingdom of Europe is formed)

1) Ardennes, 1940

2) Battle of Brody (aka Dubna), 23-30 June 1941

3) The Dieppe Raid, 19 August 1942

4) Kursk (and the Battle of Prokhorovka on the 12th), July 1943

The Battlefield

5) Market Garden ('a bridge too far') - 17 Sept. 1944

A very good Documentary can be found on yourtube

6) Battle of the Bulge (16 December 1944 – 25 January 1945)

The pages in this topic are :-

+ WW2 Brody Dubno

+ WW2 Dieppe - (Issue 1)

+ WW2 2nd El Alamein == Latest changes (modified 8th Jul 2020 03:35.)

+ CF El Alamein map

+ WW2 Kursk

+ WW2 Market Garden - (overview)

+ WW2 Arnhem

+ WW2 Nijmegen Arnhem

Next page :- WW2 Brody Dubno